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Rauhanturvaoperaatioiden tehokkuudessa koetaan olevan runsaasti parantamisen varaa. 
Yhtenä keskeisenä kehittämiskohteena on ryhmien välisen yhteistyön tehostaminen. Tässä 
opinnäytetyössä yhteistyötä on lähestytty yleisluontoisen operaation organisaatiorakenteen 
kannalta. Tarkastelu keskittyy tunnistamaan rauhanturvaoperaatioiden keskeiset piirteet, 
niiden onnistumis- ja epäonnistumistekijät, yleisluontoiset sidosryhmät ja niiden 
vaikutuskyvyn operaation lopputulokseen. Opinnäytetyö on toteutettu yhteistyössä Laurea-
ammattikorkeakoulun ja Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisen keskuksen IECEU (Improving the 
Effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention) -projektin kanssa ja työn 
tavoitteet ovat osaltaan määräytyneet niiden pohjalta.  
 
Työn tavoitteena on ollut selvittää organisatoriset mahdollisuudet tukea yleisluontoisen 
rauhanturvaoperaation sidosryhmien välistä yhteistyötä ja tuottaa näiden tekijöiden avulla 
yleinen malli organisaatiosta. Opinnäytetyö toteutettiin survey-tutkimuksena. Työssä 
selvitettiin miten rauhanturvaoperaatiot ovat kehittyneet, mitkä ovat onnistumisen 
edellytyksiä operaatioissa, mitkä organisaatioteorioiden teemat soveltuvat operaatioihin, 
mitä sidosryhmiä operaatioissa on ja miten ne kykenevät vaikuttamaan operaatioon. 
 
Tiedonhankinnan keskeisiä menetelmiä ovat olleet teoriaan tutustuminen lähdeaineiston 
avulla ja kyselyn sekä haastattelujen tekeminen. Teoriaosuuksissa on käytetty pääosiltaan 
vertaisarvioituja artikkeleita. Kyselyihin valikoitui vastaajiksi laajasti aihepiiriä ymmärtäviä 
henkilöitä, joilla oli kokemusta sidosryhmien välisestä yhteistyöstä useista 
rauhanturvaoperaatioista. Haastatteluilla hankittiin vaihtoehtoisia mielipiteitä esitetyille 
johtopäätöksille. 
 
Kerätty aineisto on analysoitu laadullisen sisällönanalyysin keinoin. Sisällönanalyysissä on 
käytetty sekä datan teemoittelua ja yhdistämistä että sisällön erittelyä. Osassa kyselyä on 
käytetty määrällisiä menetelmiä muodostamaan kuvaus tilanteesta. 
 
Kehittämisehdotuksena on esitetty rauhanturvaoperaatioiden organisaatioiden rakentamista 
ympäristön ja tilanteen huomioiviksi, evoluutioon perustuviksi, joustaviksi kokonaisuuksiksi. 
Organisaation rakenteen tulee perustua tarpeeseen. Keskeiset sidosryhmät tulee osallistaa 
mahdollisimman monella tasolla operaation toimintaan. Tällä tuetaan strategisten 
tavoitteiden ymmärrystä läpi koko organisaation. Ruohonjuuritasolla organisaation tulee olla 
vapaaehtoisuuden ja itseorganisoinnin varaan rakentuvia verkostoja ja yhteisöjä. Tiedonkulun 
parantaminen tunnistettiin yhdeksi yhteistyöhalua lisääväksi tekijäksi. Yhtenä 
jatkotutkimustarpeena esitetään tiedonkulun viitekehyksen analyysiä ja tietojärjestelmän 
konseptointia. 
 
Tuotettua organisaatiomallia ei ole testattu käytännössä, eikä se sellaisenaan sovellu 
käytäntöön. Sen sisältämiä ideoita voidaan hyödyntää esimerkiksi koulutuksessa ja operaa-
tioiden suunnittelussa. Mallin ideoiden luotettavuutta on parannettu antamalla kaikille 
kyselyyn vastanneille ja haastatelluille mahdollisuus kommentoida ideoita. 
 
Asiasanat: Rauhanturvaaminen, Organisaatio, Sidosryhmäanalyysi, Yhteistyö, Vuorovaikutus 
Ohjaaja: Seppo Leminen, Laurea 
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Executive summary  
 
A comprehensive approach to peace operations is the most efficient known way to stabilize a 
war-torn country. Comprehensiveness means using all stakeholders and capabilities to achieve 
strategic objectives, which brings together the best capabilities of civilian and military 
components. 
Many scholars mention that a lack of cooperation is causing ineffectiveness in operations. The 
objective of this thesis is to find organizational means to support the cooperation and to 
adapt the findings into a generic organization. The objective was developed by IECEU 
project’s (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention 
project) content at Laurea University of Applied Sciences and the Finnish National Defence 
Forces’ International Center. 
This study approaches the objective through a generic operation. Comprehensiveness means 
cooperation between all the stakeholders acting in the area. The organization is a description 
of them. The study is not directed to any individual actor. The actors have been generalized 
and grouped into larger entities. Consequently, the developed model cannot be used as such 
but it can be adapted and utilized when developing a suitable model for a real situation. 
This thesis is a survey study. The studied issues were the idea of comprehensiveness, the 
development of peace operations and their success factors, adopting organizational theories 
into peace operations and the stakeholders within peace operations and their ability to affect 
the outcome. 
The data was collected by studying theory, conducting a survey and doing interviews. The 
theoretical part consists mainly of published peer-reviewed articles. The survey and 
interviews were utilized to fill the information gaps and to confirm theories’ applicability to 
peace operations. The survey respondents and the interviewees had extensive experience on 
the top level of peace operations. 
The data was mainly analyzed by content analysis and supported by statistical methods. The 
analyzing methods were qualitative content analysis and content isolation. Two survey rounds 
were numeric and were therefore analyzed by statistical methods.  
The main findings are presented below. 
Comprehensiveness Has Many Nicknames 
Several international actors, such as the European Union and the United Nations, have 
recognized a need to act comprehensively to reach objectives. They tend to have different 
names for similar actions. Comprehensiveness has been described through terms such as 
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Comprehensive Approach, Integrated Missions and Whole-of-Government Approach. The 
terms are often often used interchangeably, thus they all describe similar ideologies. In this 
thesis, comprehensiveness is understood to be today’s way to approach peace operations. 
Therefore, the term peace operation is used. 
Recognizing Stakeholders Is Essential in Comprehensive Actions 
Several stakeholders are active in peace operations today. They must be recognized to have a 
theoretical possibility to enable objective-based actions. The recognition must be done as 
early as possible in the preparation and planning phase. This allows them to participate from 
the beginning. The stakeholders can be categorized for instance by activities, objectives, 
geographical area or governance level. 
Even though each operation is unique, this thesis studied a generic operation. Therefore, 
twenty stakeholder groups were established and utilized in the orgnaization forming. In 
reality, each group should be further divided into smaller groups. For instance, the group of 
local people used in this thesis can be divided into smaller groups by ethnicity, religion or 
area. After the stakeholders are recognized, they can be analyzed. 
Stakeholder Analysis Is a Useful Tool to Study the Stakeholders 
Traditionally the stakeholder analysis is utilized during or after the actions. In this thesis, it is 
used proactively to find the powerful and interested stakeholder groups. It can be argued that 
each sub-part of the operation should have a core group, which should act in as many levels 
as possible. It shold be established from sufficiently powerful and interested stakeholder 
groups who are working to achieve the objectives. This supports achieving strategic 
objectives. In addition, the local groups with high interest should be integrated into the core 
group. Although they tend to have a high level of interest but low level of power to function 
individually, integrating them into the core group will support the authority transition 
process. In addition, the analysis recognized high power groups which had a negative effect 
on the peace process. Mitigating the actions of these groups is very important and supports 
the achievement objectives. 
Information Supports Achieving Objectives 
Access to information is an essential factor in reaching the strategic objectives. The 
information can be utilized only if it is accessible. The stakeholders should form an 
information network enabling the information to reach the end-users. This contributes to a 
situational understanding and to reaching the objectives, and makes it possible to participate 
in a more efficient way. 
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The core stakeholders should be integrated into the information network as soon as possible. 
This will affect their understanding of the objectives and support their objective setting and 
actions as a whole. Through early participation, interaction is increased by joint planning, 
execution and evaluating actions. This supports the stakeholders so that they know each 
other and decreases the obstacles for cooperation. 
Evolution-Based Organization Supports Cooperation 
The environment and changes in the situation demand the organization to be self-renewing. 
The structure of the organization is to be based on need. Therefore, the organization has to 
be able to confront the challenges of time-based changes as well as regional changes in the 
situation. The core group has to be involved in as many levels as possible to better 
understand the strategic objectives and their consistent pursual. The lower the level of the 
organization, the more it should be based on self-emerging voluntary communities and 
networks. 
Critique of the Conclusions 
The presented organization structure cannot be used as such in operations but the ideas it 
inholds can be used, for instance, in training and planning of an operation. The structure was 
not tested in practice but all the participants of the survey and interviews were given a 
possibility to comment on it. They did not express differing opinions towards the argued 
principles. 
All the presented stakeholders were not represented in the survey. This lowers the credibility 
of the results. The number of respondents was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the 
results can be utilized to better understand the situation of peace operations. 
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Executive summary  
 
Kokonaisvaltainen lähetymistapa rauhanturvaamiseen on nykytiedon valossa tehokkain tapa 
nostaa sotaan ajautunut maa jaloilleen. Kokonaisvaltaisuudella tarkoitetaan kaikkien 
sidosryhmien ja suorituskykyjen käyttöä strategisten tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi. 
Kokonaisvaltaisessa toiminnassa hyödynnetään sekä siviili- että sotilastoimijoiden paras 
tietotaito. 
Useissa tutkimuksissa mainitaan sidosryhmien välisen yhteistyön puutteen aiheuttavan 
toiminnan tehottomuutta. Tämän opinnäytetyön tavoitteena oli selvittää organisaation 
näkökulmasta mahdollisuuksia tukea yhteistyötä ja muodostaa tulosten perusteella 
yleisluontoinen organisaatiomalli. Tavoite asetettiin yhteistyössä Laurea-
ammattikorkeakoulun ja Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisen keskuksen IECEU (Improving the 
Effectiveness of the Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention) -projektin kanssa.  
Tutkielma lähestyy tavoitetta yleisluontoisen operaation kautta, missä kokonaisvaltaisuus 
ymmärretään kaikkien toimialueella olevien sidosryhmien yhteistyönä. Organisaatiolla 
tarkoitetaan näin ollen sidosryhmien muodostamaa kokonaisuutta. Opinnäytetyötä ei sidottu 
yksittäiseen toimijaan, vaan toimijoista on muodostettu tarkasteluryhmiä. Tästä johtuen 
mallia ei voi sellaisenaan käyttää, mutta sitä voidaan hyödyntää tilanteeseen sopivan 
organisaation rakentamisessa. 
Opinnäytetyö toteutettiin survey-tutkimuksena. Tarkasteltuja kokonaisuuksia olivat 
kokonaisvaltaisuuden periaate, operaatioiden kehitys ja menestystekijät, 
organisaatioteorioiden soveltaminen operaatioihin, toimintaympäristön sidosryhmien 
tunnistaminen sekä niiden halu ja kyky vaikuttaa lopputulokseen.  
Data kerätttiin tutkimalla alan teoriaa, kyselyllä ja haastatteluin. Teoriaosuuden perustan 
muodostavat julkaistut ja vertaisarvioidut artikkelit. Kyselyä ja haastatteluja hyödynnettiin 
tiedon täydentämiseen ja varmentamiseen rauhanturvaamiseen soveltuvaksi. Vastaajilta ja 
haastateltavilta vaadittiin laaja kokemus rauhanturvaamisen ylätasolta. 
Data analysoitiin pääosin sisällönanalyysin keinoin ja tukena käytettiin tilastollisia 
menetelmiä.  Pääanalyysimenetelminä käytettiin laadullista sisällönanalyysiä sekä sisällön 
erittelyä. Kahden kyselykierroksen data analysoitiin tilastollisin menetelmin. 
Tutkimuksen kannalta keskeiset tulokset ovat esitetty alla. 
Kokonaisvaltaisuudella on monta kutsumanimeä 
Useat kansainväliset toimijat, kuten esimerkiksi Euroopan Unioni ja Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat, 
ovat tunnistaneet tarpeen toimia kokonaisvaltaisesti strategisten tavoitteiden 
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saavuttamiseksi. Usein toimijat kuitenkin käyttävät samoista asioista erilaisia nimityksiä 
toiminnan selittämiseksi. Kokonaisvaltaista lähestymistapaa on kuvattu esimerkiksi termein 
Comprehensive Approach, Integrated Missions ja Whole-of-Government Approach. Termien 
moninaisuus sekoittuu useissa yhteyksissä. Tässä opinnäytetyössä kokonaisvaltaisuus 
käsitetään nykyaikaiseksi rauhanturvaamiseksi ja siitä käytetään termiä Peace Operations.  
Sidosryhmien tunnistaminen välttämätöntä kokonaisvaltaisessa toiminnassa 
Nykyaikaisen rauhanturvaamisen toiminta-alueella toimii useita sidosryhmiä. Sidosryhmät on 
ensin tunnistettava, jotta ne voivat edes teoriassa toimia tavoitteellisesti asetettujen 
päämäärien hyväksi. Tunnistaminen tulee tehdä valmistelu- ja suunnitteluvaiheessa 
mahdollisimman aikaisen osallistamisen varmistamiseksi. Sidosryhmät voidaan ryhmitellä 
esimerkiksi toiminnan, tavoitteiden, maantieteellisen toiminta-alueen tai hallintotason 
mukaisesti. 
Jokainen operaatio on ainutlaatuinen, mutta tässä työssä käsiteltiin yleisluontoista 
operaatiota. Tästä johtuen opinnäytetyössä muodostettiin kaksikymmentä ryhmittymää, joita 
hyödynnettiin kokonaisvaltaisen organisaation rakentamisessa. Tositilanteessa kukin 
muodostettu ryhmittymä tulee jakaa yksityiskohtaisemmin. Esimerkiksi tässä työssä käytettiin 
paikallisten ihmisten ryhmittymä, mikä pitäisi todellisuudessa jakaa yksityiskohtaisemmaksi 
esimerkiksi etnisen taustan, uskonnon tai asuinalueen mukaan. Kun toimijat on tunnistettu 
voidaan aloittaa niiden analysointi. 
Sidosryhmäanalyysiä kannattaa hyödyntää toimijoiden analysoinnissa 
Perinteisesti sidosryhmäanalyysiä hyödynnetään toiminnan aikaisessa ja jälkeisessä 
arvioinnissa. Tässä opinnäytetyössä analyysiä hyödynnettiin ennakoivasti kyvykkäiden ja 
kiinnostuneiden sidosryhmien tunnistamisessa. Tuloksena havaittiin, että operaation osa-
alueisiin kannattaa muodostaa ydinryhmät, jotka toimivat mahdollisimman monella tasolla. 
Ydinryhmään tulisi kuulua riittävän kyvykäs ja kiinnostunut ryhmä tavoitteiden eteen 
ponnistelevia. Tällä tuetaan strategisten tavoitteiden saavuttamista. Lisäksi ydinryhmään 
tulisi integroida paikalliset kinnostuneet ryhmät. Näillä paikallisilla ryhmillä on tyypillisesti 
korkea halu toimia, mutta heikko kyky toimia itsenäisesti. Paikallisten ryhmien integrointi 
ydinryhmään edesauttaa myöhemmin vastuun siirtämisessä paikallisille. Analyysissä havaittiin 
myös erittäin kyvykäs joukko ryhmittymiä, joilla oli halu toimia rauhanprosessia vastaan. 
Näiden ryhmien huomioiminen on erittäin tärkeää lopputuloksen kannalta. 
Tieto tukee tavoitteiden saavuttamista 
Tiedon saatavuus on keskeinen tekijä strategisten tavoitteiden saavuttamisessa. Tietoa 
voidaan hyödyntää vain jos se on saatavilla. Rauhanturvaamisen sidosryhmien tulisi 
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muodostaa tietoverkosto, jonka avulla tieto kohtaa tehokkaasti tarvitsijan. Tämä parantaa 
tilanteen ymmärtämistä, tavoitteiden saavuttamista ja antaa mahdollisuuden osallistua 
toimintaan. 
Ydinsidosryhmät tulisi ottaa mukaan tiedon vaihtoon mahdollisimman aikaisessa vaiheessa, 
jotta strategisten tavoitteiden ymmärrys vaikuttaisi omien tavoitteiden asetteluun ja 
kaikkeen toimintaan. Aikaisen osallistamisen kautta yhdessä tehty suunnittelu, toteutus ja 
toteutuksen arviointi lisäävät sidosryhmien välistä vuorovaikutusta. Tämän avulla 
sidosryhmillä on mahdollisuus tuntea toisiaan syvällisemmin ja pienentää kynnystä 
yhteistyöhön. 
Evoluutioon perustuva organisaatio tukee yhteistyötä 
Toimintaympäristön ja tilanteen muutokset edellyttävät organisaatiolta uusiutumiskykyä. 
Organisaatiorakenne tulee perustua tarpeeseen. Tämän vuoksi organisaation on kyettävä 
vastaamaan sekä ajallisesti että alueellisesti erilaisiin ja muuttuviin tilanteisiin. 
Ydinsidosryhmien tulee olla mukana mahdollisimman monella tasolla, jotta strategiset 
tavoitteet ymmärretään ja niitä tavoitellaan johdonmukaisesti. Mitä alemmas 
organisaatiorakenteessa laskeudutaan sitä enemmän toiminnan tulisi perustua itseohjautuvien 
vapaaehtoisten yhteisöjen ja verkostojen toimintaan. 
Johtopäätösten arviointi 
Esitettyä organisaatiorakennetta ei voi sellaisenaan käyttää operaatioissa, mutta sen 
sisältämiä ideoita voidaan hyödyntää esimerkiksi koulutuksessa ja operaation suunnittelussa. 
Rakennetta ei testattu käytännössä, mutta kaikille kyselyyn ja haastatteluun osallistuneilla 
varattiin kommentointimahdollisuus. He eivät esittäneet eriäviä mielipiteitä esiintuotuja 
periaatteita vastaan. 
Kyselyn vastaajat eivät edustaneet kaikkia opinnäytetyössä esiteltyjä sidosryhmiä. Tämä 
osaltaan laskee tulosten uskottavuutta. Vastaajien lukumäärä ei ole riittävä tilastollisesti 
merkittävien johtopäätösten tekemiseen. Tuloksia voidaan kuitenkin hyödyntää paremman 
tilanneymmärryksen aikaansaamiseksi.  
Sidosryhmien yhteistyön puute on yksi tehottomuuden aiheuttaja rauhanturvaoperaatioissa. 
Tässä opinnäytetyössä yhteistyötä lähestytään organisaation näkökulmasta. Opinnäytetyö on 
toteutettu yhteistyössä Laurea-ammattikorkeakoulun ja Puolustusvoimien kansainvälisen 
keskuksen IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention)  
-projektin kanssa. Työn tavoitteet ovat osaltaan määräytyneet yhteistyön pohjalta. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms in alphabetical order 
Abbreviation or 
acronym 
Explanation 
AU African Union 
CA Comprehensive Approach 
CCM Comprehensive Crisis Management 
CMC Crisis Management Center 
CMI Crisis Management Initiative 
CMO Crisis Management Operations 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
EBAO Effect Based Approach to Operations 
EBO Effect Based Operations 
EU European Union 
FINCENT Finnish International Center 
GO Governmental Organization 
ICM Integrated Crisis Management 
IECEU Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in European Union Conflict 
Prevention 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization 
IO International Organization 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) 
MNE Multinational Experiment 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
PKO Peace Keeping Operations 
PSO Peace Support Operations 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
UN United Nations 
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force (Egypt) 
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle-East) 
WHOGA Whole-of-Government Approach 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of Peace Operations 
Ineffectiveness is common when supporting nations to build sustainable peace. Lives, time, 
money and equipment are wasted and hope for a better future is lost by incapable 
management of situations. By using available resources ineffectively, or unwillingly, the crisis 
is prolonged and number of casualties rises. 
Reasons for inefficiency have been discussed vastly. One key reason is inability to coordinate 
and to cooperate (IECEU 2015, Annex 2; Häikiö 2016, 14—17; Bishop 2011, 67—72; Ryter 2001, 
40—41; Isles 2005, 53—59; Smith 2004, 11). The survey conducted for this thesis also supports 
this observation. 
The United Nations have commonly been recognized to be the main provider of peace 
framework (Lijn 2006). It can be argued that other relevant providers are the European Union 
(EU), the African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Organizations can cooperate in missions to 
widen the perspective and to increase available capabilities. This types of missions are 
introduced in section 2.1. Organizations mentioned do not usually have as comprehensive 
capabilities and legitimacy as the United Nations have. 
The United Nations’ budget for its 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations is currently $8.27 
billion, total number of personnel working in these operations is almost 119,000 and the 
amount of people living in the operation areas is 125 million. Compared to global military 
expenditures the budget is 0.5 %. (United Nations 2016a; United Nations 2016b.) This is 
presented only to give an idea of the resources and effects. 
Indications exist that the capabilities are used inefficiently. UN security council’s 
procurement audit (United Nations 2006) indicated a misuse of hundreds of millions of US 
dollars. Utstein study revealed that less than 45 % of peacebuilding projects had a link to a 
strategic objective (Smith 2004, 10). This and many other studies have shown the lack of 
coherence between actions and objectives. Reaching strategic objectives is severely 
hampered due to this. (Coning 2012, 72.) A better level of coherence is needed to perform 
more efficiently. 
The Assistant Secretary General Banbury (2016) wrote in an article in New York Times that 
mismanagement and political drivers are prime reasons for the inefficiency of peace 
operations. He warns that bureaucracy is getting in the way of objectives. As an example, he 
mentions that 80 % of the resources in the Mali operation are used for logistics and self-
protection. Banbury forms it well: 
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 “If you locked a team of evil geniuses in a laboratory, they could not design a 
bureaucracy so maddeningly complex, requiring so much effort but in the end 
incapable of delivering the intended results. The system is a black hole into 
which disappear countless tax dollars and human aspirations, never to be seen 
again”. (Banbury, 2016.) 
As the United Nations’ peacekeeping efforts are failing on top level, the root level is also 
facing challenges. The forces are committing incomprehensible crimes which are partly 
ignored by senior staff. (Banbury 2016; Du Plessis & Pete 2004; Patrick 2015.) It seems 
obvious that critical evaluation needs to be done to get a better track record. 
Today the operations, for instance, in Iraq, Ukraine, Ivory Coast, Mali, Central African 
Republic and Afghanistan are commonly considered more demanding than the earlier ones 
(Finnish Government 2014, 12). Latest operations and peacebuilding are often considered 
ways to modernize the institutions and governance within the country to support the 
sustainability (Pugh 2004, 40, cited in Coning 2012, 35). The recent operations in Afghanistan 
and operations against ISIS have been formed by coalitions of more than 50 countries. These, 
and other recent, complex operations have guided us towards comprehensiveness and 
cooperation of all the stakeholders. Purely military solutions are argued to fail. (Stavridis 
2016, v; Finnish Government 2009, 16—18; Rietjens & Lucius 2016, 1; Frerks 2016, 42; 
Olsthoorn & Soeters 2016, 246; NATO 2010a, 6—7; European Union 2013, 13; United Nations 
2013b, 6.)  
Stedman (2001, 12) categorized 16 operations from 1980 to 2000 where in most cases UN was 
the principal implementer. Six were deemed to be successful, four were partial successes and 
six were failures. A correlation between the difficulty, willingness and the outcome was 
discovered. The more difficult the situation, the more likely it was to be a failure if the 
willingness was low. Unfortunately, implementing an operation without sufficient level of 
willingness is estimated to have a high risk of failing. Also, in some cases when the 
international community is not intervening rapidly they are not acting as they are expected 
to. This brings a balancing dilemma between state’s rights and international community’s 
responsibility to protect individuals.  
Evaluating the crises at hand by using Stedman’s (2001, 10—11) criteria we can argue that the 
consideration of more complex operations is useful. The variables used were the number of 
parties involved, the state of peace agreement, the status of spoilers1, the state of the 
nation, the amount of soldiers in arms, available natural resources, the networks interfering 
                                                 
1 Spoiler is a person or a group benefitting of a crisis and not seeing sustainable peace in their 
best interest. 
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and the reason for the crisis. Categorizing operations as successes or failures is not black or 
white. For instance, should operations such as United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and United Nations Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) be considered successes or failures as the 
latest of them, UNFICYP, began in 1964 and is still ongoing (United Nations 2013)? At least the 
mentioned operations have contributed to peace and the areas are relatively stable. Coning 
(2012, 27) has stated that in some cases the state needs support from the international 
community for an indefinite time, which he argues to be a far better solution than war. 
The overall observation is that peace operations have adapted to situations from dividing the 
warring factions to a complex state building which cannot be handled by any stakeholder by 
itself. Problems are so demanding that they should be handled internationally (Koenders 
2016, x—xi). Only through mutual respect and understanding an efficient complex operation 
can be created. (Shetler-Jones 2016, 101; Mougne & Groot 2016, 232). Comprehensiveness, 
integration, hybrid or whole-of-government operations are not the objective but a means to 
reach it. The demand for organized cooperation is estimated to rise in the future. The success 
or failure can be determined only by long-term achievements related to the country’s 
pacification. (Coning 2016, 24; Harisalo 2010, 315.) 
1.2 Objective and Research Questions 
The objective for the thesis was suggested by IECEU2 project coordinated by Laurea University 
of Applied Sciences and Finnish National Defence University’s International Center. Finland’s 
Crisis Management Centre has also been consulted to define the objective. Hassi (2016) 
introduces a need for further study which would answer how a peace operation should be 
conducted, lead and managed to be more efficient. 
This thesis contributes to the complexity of a peace operation’s organization. The objective is 
to introduce a comprehensive generic model for the organization that supports interaction. 
The model cannot be applied directly to any environment but it will give ideas to every 
environment. The objective is demanding as building sustainable peace and growth is seen to 
be one of the most difficult tasks (Coning 2012, 181). 
The objective is to create an argued organizational model to support the cohesion. The model 
will inhold organizational theories’ principles and lessons learnt from the recent studies 
conducted in the field of peace operations. The product will not be tied to any specific actor 
but can be applied to the common peace contributing unions such as the United Nations, the 
European Union and the African Union. The organigram will highlight ideas and principles on 
the success essentials. 
                                                 
2 Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in European Union Conflict Prevention. 
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The research questions are: 
1. How should a peace operation be organized to support effectiveness? 
a. What is a peace operation? 
b. What are the agents of success in peace operations? 
c. What is an organization? 
d. What kind of organization supports interaction? 
e. Who are the stakeholders in a peace operation? 
f. What are the powers and interests of the stakeholders that affect an operation? 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Structure of the thesis in presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the thesis 
Sections from two to five are based on literature reviews. Each section has a specific theme. 
Many terms are used to explain the entity of peace operations. In second section, the 
ideology is studied and an answer to the sub-question 1.a is provided. In the same section the 
principles that enable a peace operation to succeed or fail are introduced and sub-question 
1.b is answered. Based on the results, survey rounds 1—3 were developed. The rounds are 
introduced in sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. 
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Third section seeks answers to the sub-question 1.c and 1.d. It considers organization through 
organizational theories and lessons learnt in the context of international and national 
complex organizations. Third section contributes the guidelines which are to be implemented 
into the organigram. Based on the results, survey round 4 was developed. The round is 
introduced in section 6.4. 
Fourth section maps the involved stakeholders in peace operations and defines the related 
problematics. Answers to the sub-question 1.e and 1.f will be argued. Based on the results 
survey round 5 was developed. The round is introduced in section 6.5. 
Fifth section describes the used methods to fulfill the empiricism and the dialogue between 
theory and empiricism.  
Sixth section introduces the survey, its results and conclusions. 
Seventh section is a synthesis and it provides a suggestion on how a peace operation should be 
organized to support interaction. Some guidance is given on how it should be delivered and 
what are the essentials of it. 
Eighth section introduces the main findings of the thesis. Also, critique and assessment of the 
study is presented. 
1.4 Limitations 
As the theme is extremely complex some limitations have been identified. The objective was 
to create a generic organization model for a generic peace operation. Therefore, it will not 
be tied to any particular organization. It can be applied into the context of, for instance, the 
United Nations, the European Union or the African Union but it is not solely meant for any of 
them. 
Many definitions can be found for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management and 
peace operations. These terminologies will not be studied in this thesis. The term peace 
operation will be used to describe the whole spectrum of terms which all have a common goal 
of establishing sustainable peace.  
An operation has many phases, beginning from identifying the need for an operation, 
continuing with planning and implementing it and finally ending and evaluating it. These 
phases will not be studied in this thesis. This study concentrates on the situation where the 
operation has been implemented and is ongoing. Nevertheless, this thesis can be used to 
support all the phases.  
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International laws, regulations and policies play a major part in the peace operation context. 
Stakeholders have policies which greatly affect their ability to interact with other 
stakeholders. This thesis gives an ideological model on how the cooperation and coordination 
could be supported in an effective way. Due to the fact that laws, regulations and policies are 
case-sensitive they will not be addressed here. 
The outcome will be an untested but plausible theoretical solution (Harisalo 2010, 36) on how 
to arrange an operation’s organization. Even though the presented organization model is 
theoretical, it has been subdued to evaluation. This adds on the validity of the model. 
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2 Peace Operations 
In this section a concept of peacekeeping and factors of outcome are studied. By finding the 
factors supporting sustainable peace, one can develop a structure and main objectives. This 
applies only to a certain level and the causalities can never be perfectly estimated (Coning 
2012, 184; Vego 2006, 51—57). Nevertheless, studies show that some factors are more 
important than others and this information can be utilized to create the objectives and means 
towards to reach them. 
2.1 Evolution of Peacekeeping 
The main object, reaching self-sustaining peace, is simple to write but difficult to achieve. 
Harisalo (2010, 20) mentions that the objectives are a way to guide all the actions and enable 
the evaluation process. Without clear objectives, all actions are equally important and 
prioritizing and decision making is hampered. According to Harisalo (2010, 21), Etzioni states 
that often the objectives are only symbolic without concrete meaning. This obviously makes it 
more difficult to evaluate the outcome since clearly stated measures of effectiveness are 
absent. Coning (2012, 194) and Hughes (2012, 115—117) argue that the most important driver 
to reach the main objective is to develop the capacity of the supported nation so that it can 
self-develop and carry the weight of a nation. 
It is later shown on the thesis that the mandate tends to drive the objectives and the means. 
The objectives should be negotiated but often decisions are made, or at least heavily 
influenced, by the most influential stakeholders (Etzioni, cited in Harisalo 2010, 20). 
One can argue that development from traditional peace operations began to evolve towards 
more complex peace operations in the 1990s. A famous report, An Agenda for Peace, was 
published in the United Nations’ General Assembly in 1992. The report introduced the idea of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. It was aimed at supporting the peace process and avoiding the 
nation to relapse. (United Nations 1992.) This was the first effort towards comprehensiveness. 
For two decades, many scholars have put an effort to further develop the idea. It seems that 
many stakeholders try to reach similar objectives individually and cooperation appears to be 
the hardest part (Coning & Friis 2011, 270—272). 
Today the operations are considered to be more demanding. There might not be a sustainable 
peace agreement or at least all the factions are not honoring it. Typically, more than two 
factions exist in modern crises and situations are close to civil wars. These environmental 
changes have caused the troops to interfere and, to some extent, lose their neutrality. The 
efforts are seen as long-term and the contributors are performing in a more integrated way 
(Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell & Sitea 2007, 52—54). 
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Participating unions have started to modify their view on peace operations. Most of them are 
looking, and even moving, into the same direction but they are using different terms. For 
instance, the European Union is using the term comprehensive approach, the United Nations 
is using hybrid or integrated operations, and in some studies the term is comprehensive crisis 
management. In addition, whole-of-government approach is also widely used.  
Categorizing peace operations can be done in many ways. In general, the operations are 
divided into generations. Kenkel (2013) divides the operations into five generations while 
Dorn (2011) uses two to four generations. The actual number is irrelevant but it is useful to 
understand the development as each generation has evolved from the previous ones. It is also 
important to understand that an operation might vary between different generations and 
have typical features of more than one generation at once. Level of military force, type of 
civilian tasks and level of cooperation with local organizations are the main variants of 
differentiating the generations (Kenkel 2013, 123—125). Five generation model is introduced 
in the following paragraphs and in Table 1. 
Generation 
Typical factors 
Legitimacy is based on Components Common issues 
First generation 
Traditional 
UN’s charter’s chapter VI Military Monitoring and reporting. 
Second generation 
Traditional  
UN’s charter’s chapter VI Military 
Civilian 
Monitoring and reporting. 
Political transition. 
Third generation 
Peace enforcement 
UN’s charter’s chapter VII Military 
Civilian 
Humanitarian 
intervention. 
Fourth generation 
Peacebuilding 
UN’s charter’s chapter VII Military 
Civilian+ 
State building. 
 
Fifth generation 
Multiple commands 
UN’s charter’s chapter VII Military + 
Civilian ++ 
State building. 
Hybrid of many 
operations. 
Plus sign indicates that the component is more advanced than it was earlier. 
Table 1: Peacekeeping evolution (Kenkel 2013) 
First generation is often referred as traditional peacekeeping. Typical factors for this 
generation are that it has strict rules of engagement aiming for self-protection, the mandate 
is under the United Nations Charter’s Chapter VI, and the international military, i.e. 
peacekeeping force, is armed lightly. Often the operation has the host nation or nations’ 
consent, the forces implementing the operation are impartial to all factions and they are not 
to use force. (Kenkel 2013, 125—126) Typical operations have been unarmed observer 
missions such as United Nations Truce Supervision Force in the Middle East. (Kenkel 2013, 
126—127; Dorn 2011.) Dorn (2011) divides the operations, for instance Egypt, where troops 
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are to separate combatants into separate groups while Kenkel (2013, 126—127) sees these as 
a part of the first generation. Observer missions have often been referred to as eternal 
operations since most have started from 1940’s to 1960’s and are still operational. 
Second generation adds the civilian component to the missions. Main civilian concern is to 
address political transition to support the peace process. Tasks such as organizing elections, 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and promoting human rights are common. 
Operations in Namibia, Mozambique and El Salvador are examples of second generation 
operations. Since the mandate for the military pillar is alike with the first generation, the 
need to evolve was noticed in the infamous operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. 
(Kenkel 2013, 128—129; Dorn 2011.) The failures in these operations created the third 
generation. 
Peace enforcement operations have a broader mandate to use force and are typically 
implemented under the United Nations Charter’s Chapter VII. A new term ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ was the outcome of the third generation. The state’s right of non-intervention 
was weighed against the responsibility to maintain human rights, i.e. the responsibility to 
protect human rights. This generation introduced an active use of regional stakeholders such 
as North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Kosovo and Australia in East Timor. (Kenkel 2013, 
130—132; Dorn 2011.) 
Fourth generation has the military mandate of the previous generation but the civilian task 
and the mandate is elevated. By this, the United Nations practically takes all the 
responsibility and authority in the corresponding state. These operations are usually referred 
to as peacebuilding where the conflict’s root causes are addressed and the state is basically 
built from ashes. This tends to widen the scope and bring many stakeholders with their own 
agendas into the theatre. Operations in East Timor and in Kosovo are examples of this 
generation. (Kenkel 2013, 132—135; Richmond 2004, 84—87; Dorn 2011.) 
Hybrid missions are the latest, the fifth generation. The describing features of missions of this 
generation include even more stakeholders in the theatre and mixed commands under the 
United Nations and regional command. This signifies that several units are operating in the 
same area under different command. This applies to civilian actors too. For instance, 
operations in Darfur and Afghanistan are hybrid operations. (Kenkel 2013, 135—137.) 
As mentioned by Barder (2010), complex problems cannot be solved by design but by 
evolution. The idea of evolutionary development is visible in the operations. One main 
problem is that each case is different and one generation might work better than the other in 
some circumstances. It can be argued that the key is to be flexible. The mission should have 
sufficient capabilities in relation to its mandate. Adjusting the mandate and the capabilities 
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should be possible and should be done during the operation if needed. The capability level 
should always be higher than the need. 
Today many organizations, for instance, the European Union, the United Nations and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization recognize the terms comprehensive crisis management, 
comprehensive approach and integrated approach. All the mentioned organizations have a 
slightly different approach to the terms but all models have an idea of cooperating with 
governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to enable the state building. On 
the other hand, Mero (2009, 55, 96—101) noticed that most vital differences are that some 
exclude the non-governmental organizations outside the comprehensiveness. The reason for 
this is that some have a strong vision of how the objective should be reached or an own 
agenda, which both might hamper the cooperation.  
In this thesis, the term peace operation was used to describe a situation where the state is 
merely non-existing and comprehensive support is needed to enable sustainable peace. This 
definition was selected because it was considered to be the broadest term and it included the 
most demanding situations. 
Lehtonen (2009) argues that cooperating should start from training and planning together to 
support the understanding of objectives. He also suggests that a good starting point for a 
better cooperation would be developing the strategy together with all the stakeholders. 
Frerks et al. (2006, 36) argue that the non-governmental organizations appear to be moving 
towards comprehensiveness since the mandates have developed and become broader. This 
might contribute to a broader interest of planning together. 
Instruments of comprehensiveness can be understood as diplomacy, civil and military crisis 
management, humanitarian methods and development cooperation (Kemppilä 2010). Hassi 
(2015, 103, 111—124; 2016, 18—21) adds overall leading of the operation to be an integral 
part of a successful peace operation. The military context can be defined as strategic level 
planning and leading and aiming to restore, secure and reconstruct the society’s vital 
structures. These objectives are met by using the political, administrative, financial, 
humanitarian and military methods effectively. (Kemppilä 2010; Pitkänen 2011.) 
Comprehensiveness focuses on coordination and communication between the stakeholders, 
especially before the peace operation. It has been seen to include the legal judiciary, rule of 
law, human security and humanitarian issues (United Nations 1994, 22; Rintakoski & Autti 
2008, 11). 
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2.2 Operation’s Structure 
In this chapter, operational lines are presented and an overall structure of a peace operation 
is bound into the typical systematic way of presenting operations. Therefore, first the idea of 
operational structure is explained. 
To understand the operational planning process, one needs to understand the ideology behind 
it. Ojasalo (2016) gives a good rationalization of strategic planning in business context, by 
using an example of orienteering. If a person is placed in an unknown location with a map, he 
first needs to understand where he is, then where he wants to go, after that which route 
should be taken and how it should be traveled. This can be applied to peace operations as 
follows: one needs to define the current situation, decide what the objective will be, what is 
the way to get there and finally how the way is going to be traveled. The idea of a basic 
structure is presented in Figure 2. Obviously, in this case, it is necessary to develop an 
understanding of who is the one traveling. This is addressed in the fourth section. 
As mentioned, first we need to develop an idea of where we stand. As Laakkonen (2011) 
argues, many reasons for the need to implement a peace operation exist: for instance, failed 
states3 and a spillover of a conflict. In relation to this thesis, we can use these as causes for 
the intervention. To point out “where we stand” we can generalize the idea to be somewhat 
the opposite than the “where we want to go”, or the end-state in Figure 2. Obviously, it 
would be easier to succeed in the operation if the starting point was not in the strategy map’s 
opposite corner. 
To establish an idea where we want to go, we need to see the context and what has caused 
the situation. At this point we can call this objective to be the end-state. The end-state is 
defined by analyzing the success factors of a peace operation and by the conducted survey. 
The way to achieve the objective is the next thing to be decided. Based on studies, the 
current best practice is the comprehensive approach ideology which uses all the capabilities 
to reach the common goal. This thesis supports the ideology of comprehensiveness. 
The last thing to be decided about the operation is to establish the operational lines which 
support the common goal the best way. They are explained later in this section. 
                                                 
3 A term collapsed state or failed state is often used which describes the overall situation 
well. The foundations of a sustainable state might not exist or only ruins remain. It is possible 
that deliberate breaches of human rights have occurred during the war. For istance, these 
reasons argue that a more throughout view needs to be developed into peace operations than 
just monitoring the fulfillment of peace agreement. 
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Figure 2: Idea of operational structure (Joint Publication 5-0 2011, III—15) 
The operational basic structure includes defining the operational phases and possibly 
operational sub-lines, leverage points for each operational line, criteria to allow continuing 
from a separate leverage point and the order for the points established. Operational planning 
defines the tasks for stakeholders and attaches them to the operational lines. These were 
assessed to be unnecessary to do within this thesis. 
2.3 Systematic Approach to Military Operations 
Interconnections in war and peace are evident. The execution of peace operations has 
approached the comprehensive ideology. One can argue that the execution of military 
operations makes no difference even though the objectives are different. For instance, Mero 
(2009, 55, 96—101) argues that Finland’s national defence’s comprehensive model and 
comprehensive approach in crisis management are supporting actions to each other as both 
tie all the capabilities to achieve common goal. He mentions that both models should be seen 
as an ideology instead of executing tasks and processes. Hyytiäinen (2016) shares this ideology 
of similarities in war operations to peace operations. 
When considering the military operations, it can be noted that the art of war has travelled 
from classical approach towards systemic view (Vego 2009). Similarly, like peacekeeping also 
the art of war can be introduced through generations. The generations are introduced in 
Table 2. (Bahnareanu 2015, 57—66.) 
In pre-World War period, the militaries fought against each other on clear fronts and the wars 
were commonly between states. During the 1st and 2nd World Wars the wars were still fought 
between states or alliances. The difference between World Wars is that development of 
armament made it possible to target larger areas and move faster. These changes were 
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adapted by the German’s in Blitzkrieg. (Bahnareanu 2015, 57—60; Hobson 2010, 625—631.) 
Simultaneously, civilians were more clearly targeted in the war. 
Typical factors 
Generation  
Peak period Characteristics 
First generation 
Mass manpower 
1st World War Nation states’ militaries. 
Fighting in lines and columns. 
Low technology: muskets, grenades etc. 
Second generation 
Concentration of 
firepower 
2nd World War Nation states’ militaries. 
Reliance on firepower. 
Medium technology: indirect fire, 
armored vehicles and airplanes. 
Third generation 
Maneuver warfare 
2nd world War to 
Vietnam and 
Korea. 
Nation states’ militaries. 
Bypassing front lines. 
Advanced medium technology: ships, 
tanks, air vessels. 
Fourth generation 
Insurgency and 
terrorism 
United States in 
Vietnam. 
Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan. 
Emerging of non-state actors. 
Professional armies. 
Asymmetric tactics. 
Influencing on A-ring. See Figure 3. 
Fifth generation 
Non-contact warfare 
21st century. War against non-state actors. 
Fading of targets. 
Combination of all means: information, 
terrorist attacks, random targets, use of 
criminals. 
Table 2: Warfare generations (Bahnareanu 2015, 57—66) 
Giulio Douhet was one of the key people related to strategic bombings during the 2nd World 
War. He highlighted the importance of air force. The idea was to destroy certain cities by air 
and to collapse civilian support for the military actions. It was assumed that it would cause 
the targeted people to start a revolution and end military actions. (Douhet 1942.) The 
mentioned methods were vastly used by both parties but later they have been found 
somewhat ineffective. No proof has been presented that the opposite side could be won by 
only using the air assets in major cities. (Gates 1997, 248—249; Mitchell 1967, 49—53.) This 
ideology has been seen as the pre-version of effect-centric paradigms because the effects are 
aimed at a larger focus than just the opposing military (Sirén 2012, 251; Szafranski 1998; 
125). 
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The idea of affecting several areas at the same time was presented by colonel Warden in the 
Persian Gulf in the 1990s. The principle is to paralyze the rings from A to E and concentrate 
all the power on the A-ring (see Figure 3). This was assumed to collapse the nations’ will to 
continue fighting. The categorization to five levels was argued to be applicable to almost 
every situation. (Warden 1998, 107—109.) 
Sirén (2012, 250—256) introduces four paradigms of the art of war. They also project the 
development from purely military point of view to a more comprehensive idea. The paradigms 
are target-centric, effects-centric, comprehensiveness in crises management and strategic 
communications. The idea of affecting is introduced in Figure 3 and it is tied to Warden’s 
rings. Sirén argues that affecting the values and identities is the most efficient way to have 
an effect. Coning (2012, 268) and Meadows (1999, 2—3) argue that in peacekeeping the most 
crucial effects can be delivered by focusing on the higher leverages as paradigms. In this 
context, it can be understood as supporting the values and identities presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Paradigms and their effects to modified Warden’s rings (Sirén 2012, 251—252) 
More systemic views began to emerge in the end of 1990s. One of these is Effect-Based 
Operations (EBO) introduced by the United States and other Effects-Based Approach to 
Operations (EBAO) introduced by NATO as well as Systemic Operational Design (SOD) applied 
by Israel and lastly Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). The idea is that a 
nation is a system which can be divided in to subsystems. By understanding the system of 
systems an effective plan can be created to fulfill the objective. (Siren 2012, 250—256; Vego 
2006, 51—59; Vego 2009, 40—48; Challans 2006.) 
The systemic views to warfare have included more guidance to the use of non-military 
capabilities to reach an objective than previous guidances. Yet, they have been criticized of 
simplifying the crises enormously and supporting the idea that the consequences can be 
predicted in complex situations such as war. The more complex the military objective is the 
 29 
harder it is to predict how it should be fulfilled. (Vego 2006, 51—59; Vego 2009, 40—48; 
Challans 2006; Sirén 2012, 253; Mattis 2008, 105—108.) The same principle has been 
identified by Coning (2012, 181, 290) in relation to peacebuilding. He argues that it is 
impossible to fully understand the complex systems. Davis (2001, xiv) argues that the 
objective of systematic approach is to enhance the odds of success and to help to understand 
the causalities better. Davis’s idea deserves some critique since especially understanding the 
causalities has been deemed to be merely impossible in more recent sources. 
The development of military operations can be seen somewhat similar to the development of 
peace operations. Both are on a journey towards more complex situations which demands a 
more comprehensive way of thinking to reach the end-states. 
 Typical Elements Description 
Douhet 
Prior to 2nd 
World War 
Strategic bombings Air force importance was highlighted. 
Assumption of fighting spirit being collapsed 
when strategic targets are being bombed by all 
the possible capabilities e.g. bombs and gas. 
Targets included civilian infrastructure. 
Warden 
Persian Gulf 
Decision making 
Key functions 
Infrastructure 
Population 
Armed forces 
Paralyzing all the elements and concentrating on 
decision making. 
EBO, EBOA, SOD Political system 
Military system 
Economic system 
Social system 
Infrastructure 
Information system 
Systemic view to warfare. By understanding 
dependencies one can affect the crucial ones 
and foresee the outcome. 
Sirén Values and Identities Adds a new level in Warden’s idea. By 
influencing the core of a nation, it can be 
affected. 
Table 3: Factors of warfare (Douhet 1942; Warden 1998; Vego 2006; Sirén 2012) 
McGlade (2006) found in his graduate research for master’s degree that Effects Based 
Operations and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) are very similar to each other. The 
difference is that SOD is presenting the incapability to predict the outcome more clearly than 
EBO. According to Sirén (2012, 252), EBAO highlights soft ways of affecting when EBO is more 
concentrated in kinetic ways. 
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EBO and EBAO both see the nation as an internal system of systems. They acknowledge that 
the overall system is built of subsystems of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure 
and information systems. Field manual 3.0 adds physical terrain and time to the subsystems 
(Field Manual 3.0 2008, 1—5, 1—9; Vego 2006, 51—57). According to Davis (2011, xiii), the EBO 
instruments used to achieve objectives are military, diplomatic, psychological and economic. 
Lines of operation are described to be political, information, military and economical 
(USFJCOM 2006, s.III—21). Vego (2009) also refers to diplomacy, information, military and 
economic (Vego 2009, 42). 
The presented ideas can be adapted to peace operations in some extent and they will be 
considered in the summary. 
2.4 Drivers for Success or Failure in Peace Operations 
What determines the success of peace operations? Paris (1997, 57) has stated that 
sustainability of peace after an operation is halted can be considered a measure of 
effectiveness. Stedman (2001, 8) adds sub-measures as economic growth, good governance 
and equitable development. 
It is important to understand the factors in operational environment prior to developing 
means to affect them (United Nations 1992, 21). As it is described earlier, predicting the 
causalities is difficult in complex environments. Obviously, it needs to be understood that 
some situations are more difficult than others and stabilizing is strongly affected by the level 
of complexity. The need for strategic coordination, and resources, is dependent of the 
complexity (Jones 2001, 2—3).  
Laakkonen (2011) describes the possible risk conditions such as failed governance, conflict 
spill-over, vulnerabilities in ungoverned strategic spaces and resource rich territories, border 
disputes, extremism and uncontrolled migration. He emphasizes that it is necessary to 
understand the environment and the transition process from conflict to safety. Laakkonen 
emphasizes that the peace process’ spoilers need to be defined from the correct point of 
view in order to support the transition. 
Traditionally signing of peace agreement and arranging elections have been seen as a new 
beginning. Nevertheless, the period following the signing has been argued to be the most 
unstable period, inholding the uncertainties and dangers. As it was shown in Angola and 
Rwanda during the 1990s, the failure in peace process can cause hundreds of thousands, even 
millions of people to be killed. (Stedman 2001, 4; Caplan 2012, 115—118; Ahmed, Keating & 
Solinas 2007, 14.) By studying the reasons for the state to relapse, methods can be found to 
mitigate them (Malone 2001). 
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According to Hirchmann (2010, 373), one road towards stability is to conduct institution 
building within the country. This will enhance the local capacity to perform as a state. 
Stedman (2001, 2, 10) argues that the most important environmental factors are spoilers and 
neighboring states. By spoilers he means the stakeholders opposing the peace process because 
it is not in their interest. Neighboring states can be seen harmful due to the same reasons as 
spoilers but, in addition, they often support the local spoilers. 
Key element for success is that peace is in the interest of a regional major power or 
otherwise a major power. In extremely complex situations, critical consideration towards the 
establishment of a peace operation should be done if such support is non-existent. 
International community’s and other states interests to risk resources also has a great affect. 
Often stakeholders also have other motives to support peace than just a pure will to help. 
(Stedman 2001, 2—5.) 
One of the most important parts in the peace process is to transform the warring stakeholders 
into political parties. This can be done in ways of demobilization and demilitarization. 
(Stedman 2001, 5—6.) Even though the furtherance of human rights is often seen as an 
important task, Tonya Putnam sees a clear causality between the transformation process and 
the fulfilment of human rights. Joanna Spear also sees the demobilization to be the most 
important goal towards peace (Stedman 2001, 15—16). 
Development in civilian security and local capacity building are found to be cost-effective 
ways of supporting the peace process. Nevertheless, failure in these two has not been seen as 
a facilitator of overall failure in peace process itself. (Stedman 2001, 3—6; Coning 2012.) 
In Stedman’s (2001, 10—11) study the complexity of the situation was assessed using the 
following factors: existence of spoilers, presence of disposable natural resources, presence of 
hostile neighbor states or networks, presence of a major power interest, existence of the 
peace agreement and the coercion level of signing, status of the collapsed state, number of 
soldiers, number of warring parties and demands for secession. First four factors have the 
most crucial effect on success. 
International community’s interest is considered to be one of the crucial factors to determine 
if the efforts and resources are sufficient (Stedman 2001, 11). 
The potential factors of success have been collected into Table 4. Internal factors are the 
ones deriving within the country and external factors are rising from outside the country. 
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Internal External 
State of peace agreement. 
Leadership through elections or other means. 
Local capability to act responsibly. 
Spoilers benefitting from the crisis. 
Converting armed factions into political parties. 
Level of human security. 
International interest for peace: global, 
regional. 
Mitigating spoilers’ supporters. 
Supporting demobilization. 
Supporting security. 
Long-term commitment. 
Supporting of local identity. 
Table 4: Factors of Success (Stedman 2001; Hirchmann 2010; Coning 2012; Sirén 2012) 
2.5 The Operational Lines of Peace Operations 
In this section the possibilities for operational lines will be explored. They should be closely 
tied to the success factors in peace operations. The lines have been collected into Table 5 to 
clarify the idea. 
Although the basic structure seems to have clear boundaries between operational lines it 
needs to be understood that they are tied to each other and stakeholders can support several 
operational lines simultaneously. Many see boundary crossing activities as important. This 
means, for instance, shared understanding of the end-state and strategy and information 
access. (Hirchman 2010, 368; Coning 2016, 18.)  
Often organizations promote individual sub-goals to be pre-requisites of enabling peace. This 
is done to support their own agenda. As mentioned earlier, less than 45 % of development 
projects had a clear link to the strategic objectives. (Stedman 2001, 5; Smith 2004, 10.) The 
operational structure should be seen greater than the sum of its parts. Each sub-goal is a way 
forward towards sustainable peace even though it might be hard to determine which should 
be addressed as sub-goals within the peace process and which are individual development 
activities unbound to the operation as a whole (Coning 2012, 30—31, 290). 
Source Security 
and Rule of 
Law 
Governance 
and 
Polical System 
Development 
and Economics 
Human 
Rights 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Stedman X X X X X 
Coning X X X X X 
Moreland X X X X  
United Nations X X X X X 
Ricigliano X X X X X 
Table 5: Collected operational lines (Coning 2012; United Nations 2006, 2010; Stedman 2001, 
2002; Moreland 2015; Ricigliano 2012) 
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The outcome of Table 5 is a combination of success factors and commonly accepted 
operational lines. One needs to understand that a viewpoint of a certain source might be such 
that it concentrates only in some factors. It does not mean that others were neglected but it 
has not been addressed due to limitations or other reasons. 
2.6 Summary 
Peace support operations have evolved to be the best possible solutions to complex problems. 
The difficulty is that complex problems are impossible to define and therefore to solve. Each 
operation is different from the others just as is the environment. Many lessons can be learnt 
but the outcome cannot be foreseen. In this thesis, the operational framework is state 
building in worst possible conditions where the international community needs to take 
temporary responsibility of actions. 
Based on literature, the success factors in peace operations are the local interest to achieve 
sustainable peace and the international community’s interest to support it along all the 
operational lines presented in Table 5.  
The system of systems view to military operations is supporting the findings. Connections 
between fifth generation peace operations and systemic approaches to warfare can be 
discovered. 
Based on this section, first, second and third survey rounds were developed. The aim was to 
iterate and possibly verify the findings from the literature. The survey is introduced in sixth 
section. 
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3 Organization Forming Principles 
In this section an understanding of organization is created. At first, the overall reason for 
organizing will be argued. Secondly, the aspects of an efficient organization will be 
introduced by reflecting on organizational theories. These aspects were subdued to a survey 
where the common principles will be connected to peace operations. This theme is 
introduced in survey round 4 in section 6.4. The aspects supported will create a basis for the 
organizational structure presented later.  
3.1 Introduction 
An organization should always be constructed to achieve certain task as efficiently as 
possible. It is a way to improve cooperation, interaction and coordination within the 
stakeholders. (Harisalo 2010, 31; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 19—21; Scott 2003, 33—38.) The 
organizational structure is to be a description of authority, guidance, supervision and 
coordinational hierarchy (Harisalo 2010, 41). Organization in this context means all the 
capabilities used to achieve the objective. This means organizing the capabilities, the 
structure, the leadership, the culture, the economics, the technology and the environment. 
One idea is that an organization should interact in all levels and be self-correcting. (Harisalo 
2010, 17—18, 313; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 19—21; Scott 2003, 26—30.)  
Richmond (2011) argues that areas where peace operations take place often adopt some 
models from the international community. Some models are adopted through guidance and 
some through cooperation. He mentions that often the outcome would be better if the locals 
were supported to build their own models. This applies to state building as well.  
Coning (2012, 36—37) argues that the liberal organizational model is seen to be the best 
organizational model to date, and it supports cooperation with states and organizations that 
have adapted similar models. According to Coning (2012, 139), Stewart states that it is hard 
to implement externally designed organizations into a nation since they tend to have their 
differentiating history of organizations which has adapted to their culture. However, Coning 
(2012, 38) argues that the state will be affected by the western model due to the 
stakeholders operating in the area. 
The United Nations (2012, 29—31) published a report which announces that an individual 
peace operation should be organized as one actor. The report also mentiones that operations 
in general can be conducted better. This section’s outcome is to point out the principles 
which should be adopted when building the peace operation’s organization. 
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3.2 Organizations’ Overall Idea 
Organizations can be categorized in many ways. According to Parson’s (Harisalo 2010, 30—31) 
categorization, a peace operation’s organization can be seen as having an integrative role 
fortifying the positive development and fulfilling the collective needs of a state. As the 
comprehensive organization is complex, it probably includes factors from all different 
categories. Therefore, the potential of several categories will be considered and analyzed. 
Large organizations are seen to have more need for formality, coordination, integration, 
supervision and resources than small organizations. Obviously, people in small organizations 
have more interaction since they possibly know each other personally. In large organizations, 
the level of formality grows and lessens the amount of individual interaction. Formation of 
informal groups is argued to be a result of this and a way to increase interaction. (Sjöstrand 
1981, 88—91.) This supports the findings presented in the introduction and in the third section 
that peace operations lack interaction in means of in coordination and cooperation. 
Harisalo (2010, 24) and Hatch and Cuncliffe (2006, 114—115) argue that leadership is one 
crucial factor in success of every organization. Leaders should take a stand on what the 
direction one should move to is and give an idea of expectations. By centralizing leadership 
the decision-making process has been seen to develop faster but at the same time more false 
decisions are made. Centralizing often makes people feel like outsiders and incapable of 
affecting the actions. According to Seppen and Lucius (2016, 58), both civilian and military 
stakeholders should be involved in the decision-making process. 
Poor organization will create a strict hierarchy and unwillingness to cooperate over the 
section or office boundaries. If the organization is built well it will enforce the will to 
cooperate and develop working methods to reach the common goal. (Harisalo 2010, 25.) 
Systems have the capability to self-organize (Coning 2012, 134). Re-organizing and self-
correcting are important and feedback is one crucial factor in it (Hendrick 2009, 6—7; 
Meadows 1999). The complex system is based on its ability to reside in the self-organizing 
capability of the local environment (Coning 2012, 184). This idea is supported by an argument 
that it is possible to solve complex problems by evolutionary means rather than by design, 
and feedback is an essential part of it (Barder 2010). This means that a correct form of an 
organization is impossible to develop but an evolving organization that is adapting to its 
environment is crucial (Coning 2012, 191—193). 
In the end, the organization is a social structure which supports reaching the main objective. 
The capability to self-organize can be enhanced by manipulating the information flow 
between the stakeholders thus supporting the interaction between them (Coning 2012, 268). 
Below the peace operation’s umbrella, there can be several cooperation levels (Friis & Jarmyr 
2008, 14—15). Coning and Friis (2011, 255—258) presented a model where the actors are 
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united, integrated, cooperative, coordinative, coexisting or competing. The level of 
coherence can vary between and within stakeholders. Coherence should be based on 
voluntary actions since it is the most effective way (Coning 2016, 23—24). As each operation 
is unique, the level of cooperation should be reflecting the operation’s needs (Gourlay 2000, 
33—44).  
Organization can be understood to be a structure interacting with its environment as shown in 
Figure 4. In the environment, there are the stakeholders of which some are cooperative and 
others competitive. As a whole, they can be understood as a network of organizations trying 
to fulfill their own objectives. The network can be structuralized by using branches where 
each organization works. Branches can be divided for instance into technological, economical, 
political and legal, social and cultural and physical. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 63—77.) 
 
Figure 4: Environment and the network (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 77) 
Organizations also have a symbolic meaning. The physical structures are a part of the 
message the organization is sending. (Hatch & Cuncliffe 2006, 246.) By underlining the local 
ownership or comprehensive collaboration among the international stakeholders it is 
controversial to build each stakeholder their own camp or their own building. It is not 
embracing the message of collaboration. Actions should embrace collaboration and thus 
support the achievement of objectives. 
Organizational structures vary based on the need. Organizational types are presented in 
Figure 5. Often the structure is a combination of different models. The structure can alter on 
the organization’s different levels. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 295—310; Harisalo 2010, 73—77.) 
It can be assumed that the conclusion of this study will be a combination of structures since it 
is very common in large organizations. 
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Figure 5: Some organizational types (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 295—310; Harisalo 2010, 73—77; 
Scott 2003, 242, 276) 
Matrix organization has vertical and horizontal information flows. The unity of command is set 
aside in this context. An easy way to understand the matrix is to see the functions as service 
producers for the processes and processes as the ones creating the value. (Harisalo 2010, 74; 
Scott 2003, 242—244; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 301—303.) In peace support operations, the 
processes can be understood as operational lines and the functions as performing tasks such 
as evaluation and information managing. Global matrix adds the service producers to the 
context and applies the functions so that they can provide services to broader area (Hatch & 
Cunliffe 2006, 304—306.) 
Project is an objective-oriented temporary organization which has limited time, resources 
and a task. A project organization uses experts from all the processes and functions based on 
their need. The experts are forming a new group together and performing separate tasks. The 
task obviously greatly affects the need of staff and individuals’ use of time. (Hatch & Cunliffe 
2006, 302—303; Artto, Martinsuo and Kujala 2006, 24, 273—342.) An individual peace 
operation can be understood as a large project (Tsvetkov, 2016). 
Multidivisional structure is supporting vertical information flow and a clear unity of command 
(Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 299—301). Divisions are understood to be similar to each other. In 
peace operations, divisions can be seen as different operations or regional commands within a 
country. 
Functional design has vertical information flow and clear unity of command. Functions are 
clear and divided from each other. (Harisalo 2010, 73—74; Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 297—298.) 
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In the context of this thesis, this can be understood as using the operational lines as 
functions. 
Virtual design and networks are based on nodes which connect the stakeholders. Virtual 
versions are often mainly based on interaction in information networks. The idea of emerging 
is free and voluntary. (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 306—308.) An example of networks is internet-
based services where the buyer and seller connect via an application. 
3.3 Organizational Theories 
In this chapter, some organizational theories and their branches are introduced. The idea is 
to find potential functions to be subdued to an expert panel and to find founding principles to 
develop the organization for a peace operation.  
Especially in large organizations it is common that a structure is a mix of different types of 
organizational forms. Therefore, the ideas of very different kind of theories and themes are 
considered. Some theories are popular in current models of the organization building of peace 
operations but, for this thesis, it was more useful to have a broader look than look into the 
current organization and fix its flaws. This ideology is supported by Hatch and Cunliffe (2006, 
97). 
Theory, Theme or Factor 
Classical Organization Theory: 
Common guidance, coordination, supervision and unity of command are executed in the 
organization (1, 2). 
Structure is a definition of power and responsibility and it needs to be commonly approved (1). 
Clear meaning can enhance cooperation (3) and enable unit forming (6). 
Hierarchy should not limit cooperation (2). 
Human Relations: 
People are the center of capability in organizations and the group they form is essential for 
success (7). 
Level of bureaucracy is relieved by considering people to be the center (7). 
Community is an unofficial organization based on deep interaction beyond boundaries (8). 
People first thinking emerges enthusiasm, motivation, innovation and adapting (7). 
Positive community is an enabling factor (8). 
People form a group and negotiate the objectives for the organization (7). 
Better results are accomplished if higher needs are satisfied (7). 
Strategic Leadership in Organization Theories: 
Mental and physical resources should be used efficiently (21). 
Top leaders develop, abandon and rephrase strategies (21). 
Strategy formulation connects all functions (21). 
Strategy is to be evaluated periodically (23). 
Strategic alliances, unions and partnerships are beneficiary and they can be managed as 
equals, contract based or delegated arrangement (24, 25). 
Large organizations’ adaptation capability has faced difficulties and therefore smaller 
independent units have been introduced (22). 
Theory of Organizations as Innovations:  
Good leadership enables people to give their best ideas and innovations for the organization 
(29). 
Certain inefficiency has an enabling effect on innovations (30). 
Significance of organized cooperation will rise in the future (31). 
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Theory of Structures: 
Large organizations can have hybrid organizations, e.g. division, matrix and network (9). 
Structure is based on objectives, efficiency and coordination (10). 
Complicated organizations self-correct themselves only if it is crucial to their survival (9). 
Bureaucratic organizations are often missing in countries which host peace operations (9). 
System Theory: 
Structuralizing causalities is beneficiary (13). 
The main focus is to use resources efficiently (14). 
Supervision is important (14). 
Intelligence of overall actions is important (14). 
Creating methods to understand, collect information of unsolved problems and to gain 
common understanding (16). 
Fundamental strategy creates effectiveness (14). 
Planning is to be interactive (15). 
Organization should adapt to its environment (15). 
Organization is more than the sum of its parts i.e. holistic approach (15). 
Evolutional Theory: 
Interdependence between organization and environment is evident (19). 
Unity with surroundings should be practiced (20). 
Unity with environment can be reached by mapping, matching, joint optimization and 
consultation (20). 
Organizations as Cultures: 
Lack off heart and spirit disable even the perfect organization (26). 
Organization culture enables success (27). 
Organization need to process surrounding cultures e.g. language, communication, religion, 
values, attitudes, social structure (28). 
Scientific Management: 
Comprehensiveness is an enabling factor (4). 
Supervision of the whole organization is important (5). 
Specific tasks for leaders create efficiency but might disturb the unity of command (5). 
Decision Making Theory: 
Overall action demands for decisions and they define the success (11). 
Critical examination of solutions is fundamental need for decision making (12). 
Resource Dependency Theory: 
Resources are used efficiently by networks between organizations (17). 
Outcome interdependence i.e. organizations need to cooperate to achieve results (18). 
Behavioral interdependence i.e. people need to cooperate to achieve results (18). 
Sources: 
1 = Harisalo 2010, 38—39 
2 = Harisalo 2010, 69—71,77—78; Hatch & 
Cuncliffe 2006,104 
3 = Harisalo 2010, 82—83, 88 
4 = Harisalo 2010, 57 
5 = Harisalo 2010, 62; (Mabon 1974, 31—32) 
6 = Galbraith 1995, 25—26 
7 = Harisalo 2010, 93, 96—97; (Hawthorne) 
8 = Harisalo 2010, 117; Peck 1987, 59—63 
9 = Harisalo 2010, 140—142 
10 = Harisalo 2010, 128; (Vartola 2004, 8, 20; 
Scott, Michell & Perry 1981, 137) 
11 = Harisalo 2010, 145 
12 = Lewis, Goodman & Fant 1995, 200—201 
13 = Hatch & Cunliffe 2006, 37 
14 = Harisalo 2010, 185—186; Flood 1999, 40—
41 
15 = Harisalo 2010, 191—192, 195; Pugh & 
Hickson 1989, 48—49 (Ackoff 1981, 1999) 
16 = Harisalo 2010, 192; (Checkland 1981) 
17 = Harisalo 2010, 228; Hatch & Cuncliffe 
2006, 80—83 
18 = Harisalo 2010, 228—229; (Pfeffer 1962, 
193) 
19 = Pugh & Hickson 1989, 48—49 
20 = Harisalo 2010, 225; Rhenman 1975, 73—
86 (Buckley 1967) 
21 = Harisalo 2010, 239—240, 242 
22 = Naisbitt 1994,273—275; Burns 2005, 126 
24 = Harisalo 2010, 255 
25 = Harisalo 2010, 256—257 
26 = Harisalo 2010, 266 
27 = Harisalo 2010, 273 
28 = Harisalo 2010, 275—277 
29 = Harisalo 2010, 286 
30 = Harisalo 2010, 310 
31 = Harisalo 2010, 315 
In case Harisalo is used as secondary source 
and primary source is not revised the primary 
source is informed in brackets. 
Table 6: Factors from organizational theories and themes 
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Some main factors of organizational theories and leadership theories are collected into Table 
6. The factors were collected through peace support operations literature. Based on a 
reflection, 24 factors were selected to be the most applicable to peace support operations. 
The factors were rephrased as claims. The claims are: 
1. Clear strategy connects all the actions. 
2. Top leaders develop and state objectives top-down. 
3. High level objectives are jointly developed by all the stakeholders. 
4. High level objectives are understood by all the stakeholders. 
5. Cooperation between the stakeholders is enhanced by common understanding of high 
level objectives. 
6. Local ownership is important/not important. 
7. The organization is built on the principles of the host nation. 
8. Host nation capacity building is important/not important. 
9. Host nation takes responsibility as soon as possible. 
10. The stakeholders are intertwined with the environment. 
11. The organization evolves during the operation. 
12. The stakeholders perform as one. 
13. Resources of the stakeholders are used to achieve overall objectives. 
14. Cooperation exceeds intra-organization (office/branch) boundaries. 
15. Cooperation exceeds agency (NGO, GO, IO) boundaries. 
16. Communities are important/not important to success. 
17. Strategic alliances are important/not important to success. 
18. Networks are important/not important to success. 
19. Organization structure is approved by the stakeholders. 
20. Overall information flow is open to the stakeholders. 
21. Follow-up is an important/not important part of all actions conducted. 
22. Tasks are planned, conducted and followed jointly with the stakeholders. 
23. Each superior has a specific task. 
24. Every person has only one superior who gives tasks and who he/she reports to. 
3.4 Summary 
Organization is an objective-based description of factors such as supervision, guidance, 
coordination and authority. Interaction with the environment is one crucial element in an 
organization. Large organizations tend to be hybrids of several organizational types: for 
instance matrix, network and functional design. 
The 24 factors presented above are subdued to assessment done by professionals to find the 
most crucial factors to implement into the organization structure. The assessment was 
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conducted on the fourth survey round.  Professionals were asked to assess the importance and 
occurrence of each factor. The results of this assessment are introduced in section 6.4. 
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4 Stakeholders and Their Ability in Peace Operations 
In this section, peace support operations’ stakeholders are presented and their ability to 
affect the operation is studied. In this context, stakeholder is defined to be understood in the 
broadest sense of state building.  
4.1 Stakeholder Categorization 
In early peacekeeping operations, the stakeholders were understood to be the warring 
factions and the military peacekeepers. As the operations have evolved to be more complex, 
the idea of stakeholders has evolved simultaneously. Today, the stakeholders have been 
identified to be all the ones affecting the situation, for instance, the local nation, 
surrounding nations, possible spoilers within the nations, international community, unions, 
warring factions, companies, criminals and non-governmental organizations (Stavridis 2016, v; 
Lehtonen 2009, 12). This ideology is supported in this thesis. 
To present an overall idea of the potential stakeholders, it is estimated that over 40,000 non-
governmental organizations function internationally. Some hundreds of those are related to 
peace and security directly. (Evans 2012.)  
As a result of this complexity the NGOs have adopted security to be one of their concerns. 
When assessing an organization, it is essential to understand that today’s crises include 
stakeholders which can be partly civilian, military or a combination of both. (Frerks et al. 
2006, 8, 36, 100.) It is neither necessary nor possible to name the individual stakeholders, but 
it is necessary to categorize them to understand their contribution capabilities towards the 
peace process. 
Evans (2012) categorizes the NGOs into three groups based on their activity. Describing 
factors are think tanks, advocacy organizations and operational organizations, and some 
might have activities in several of these groups. 
Tsvetkov (2015, 131—156) has recognized the stakeholders in the former Yugoslavia area in a 
stakeholder analysis. The ones mentioned were local ethnic groups, security forces, political 
elite, international humanitarian organizations and NGOs inside and outside the country. The 
analysis discovered that the security forces, political elite and international humanitarian 
organizations had the highest interest and power to the situation. NGOs within the country 
had an average influence and the ones outside the country had low influence. The rest of the 
groups had average influence. By studying this, one can argue that some stakeholders are 
more capable and therefore more important than others thus the ones with low influence still 
have the capacity to function even though they are incapable of influencing the situation by 
themselves. Together they contribute substantially to the situation. 
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Large stakeholders tend to have more influence than the others. Their influence is directed 
through all the organizations participated. For instance, United States pays 29 % of the United 
Nations’ peacekeeping budget. This equals 2.5 billion dollars in 2015 (Secretary of State 
2014). It is obvious that by contributing the relevant stakeholders want to influence actions. 
To have more influence, the large contributors have conducted their own fact-finding 
missions parallel to the official delegations. This is seen as a way to make sure their interests 
are considered in the reports and recommendations. (Dijkstra 2014, 34.) 
One reason for the security forces having a great influence might be that security is one of 
the crucial issues to address in the beginning. In addition, they are capable of sharing security 
information, strengthening the capability of local security forces and contributing to the 
demobilization process. Military is merely self-sustainable and able to support others if it is 
assessed to be in their best interests. (Frerks et al. 2006, 9; Häikiö 2016.) 
Coning (2012, 234—235, 261, 268, 275—276) and Dijkstra (2014, 36) argue that the 
international community often takes a larger piece from the pie that would essentially be 
wise and necessary. This creates an ineffective environment for the local system to evolve 
and enhance its ability to self-organize. These capabilities ought to be developed as main 
objectives by the international community.  Making peace sustainable and to reach 
operational success a balance should be found between international support and local 
capacity building. In the end, the peace needs to be established by the locals and should 
emerge from their capacity instead of the international support. 
Shetler-Jones (2016, 99) and Rietjens (2016, 288) are supporting the idea of bringing the local 
perspective and ownership into the peace process as soon as possible. This should be done 
because they are the only ones who can make it work in the long term.  
 
Figure 6: Stakeholders and objectives in peace operations (Lehtonen 2009, 12, 38) 
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Lehtonen has presented the stakeholders and the most important objectives in his thesis as 
Figure 6 describes. 
4.2 Understanding Interaction in Peace Operations 
It is a known fact that many interaction levels exist. Levels are often described or divided by 
artificial categories. When studying the interaction, one needs to bear in mind that individual 
stakeholders separately have relations with each other. Based on a case-study in Liberia, a 
model presented in Figure 7 was created. It explains the relations in civil-military context in 
the framework of non-governmental organizations. In this case, the categories were 
principled neutralists, pragmatists and supporters. (Frerks et al. 2006, 89—92) 
It needs to be understood that the aim is not to have as high level of cooperation as possible 
since it may have unexpected outcomes. The cooperation needs to be voluntary-based and 
case- sensitive. By voluntariness the cohesion will becme optimal. (Coning 2012, 290.) 
 
Figure 7: NGO cooperation in civil-military affairs (Frerks et al. 2006, 89—91) 
Efforts have been made to develop joint principles to non-governmental organizations for 
cooperating with the military. For instance, such work was done 2003—2004 to review the 
original Joint Principles of Operation for NGOs from 1996. In the end, the differences in 
opinion, mainly between local and international NGOs was overwhelming and many common 
guidelines were left out from the final version. (Frerks et al. 2006, 89—92.) As Figure 7 
clarifies, the local NGOs are often more willing to cooperate than the international ones. 
Similarities in the categorization was found also in Afghanistan: the support level raising from 
the local NGOs was greater in the calm parts of Afghanistan. The overall ideology among the 
cooperation supporters was that the people’s needs override secondary principles related to 
the non-supporters. It was mentioned that the ones who can have enough resources are 
capable of being more selective about the stakeholders they cooperate with. This ideology 
seems to be common in aid agencies’ field level. (Frerks et al. 2006, 9, 56—57, 104—105.) An 
argument can be made that the same idea can be adapted to the less supportive areas in 
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Afghanistan since the openly supportive role from local NGO towards the military could have 
been a direct security risk. This supports the idea of security being a foundation for 
development. It also brings into attention that the attitude can vary between open and closed 
situations e.g. when outsiders are observing the situation or a closed-doors negotiation. 
One main reason for NGOs not to cooperate with the military is the increased security risks, 
especially if the military is not impartial (Frerks 2016, 33). The military does not, however, 
usually have this problem since they are the ones providing security and supplying their own 
force protection. Delivering security is one reason why the peacekeepers are more popular 
among the locals than the NGOs (Frerks et al. 2006, 9). 
Another, more comprehensive, model of interaction levels and relationship types was 
presented by Coning and Friis (2011, 258). The model takes all the stakeholders into account 
and recognizes six levels of cooperation: unity, integration, cooperation, coordination, 
coexisting and competing. These levels can be applied to intra-agency, whole-of-government, 
inter-agency and international-local relationships. A clarification is presented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Interaction and relations in four environments (Coning & Friis 2011, 253—261) 
Intra-agency can be understood to be one ministry and its section. Whole-of-government can 
be seen as the ministries of a country. Inter-agency signifies for instance interaction between 
NATO and EU. International-local interaction can be understood as the local state and 
international actors. One needs to understand that interaction levels between stakeholders 
vary case by case and peace operation environments are often hybrids of them all. (Coning & 
Friis 2011, 253—261.) 
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It has been acknowledged that the military seldom has anything against working with the non-
governmental organizations and the collaboration is supported. This is probably because 
military tends to see that they cannot solve all the situations and others might perform better 
in their field of expertise. It might also have an effect that the military is often under the 
operation’s umbrella unlike the NGOs and therefore understands the main objectives more 
thoroughly. One concern stated by an NGO representative is that the military wants to use 
them in operating instead of cooperating with them. (Frerks et al. 2006, 9, 58, 104.)  
It has been argued that some operational lines or tasks might have more potential for 
cooperation than others. For instance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are 
seen as potential as well as supporting the rule of law, election support and the resettlement 
of people (Frerks et al. 2006, 9). 
As an overall idea of cooperation, it can be summed up that stakeholders seem to cooperate 
when it is in their best interest (Rietjens & Lucius 2016, 2). This brings into attention that by 
supporting the understanding of the common objectives and enabling the stakeholders to 
voluntarily select the level of cooperation the outcome might be more effective than it is 
today.  
4.3 Ways to Enhance Interaction 
Several reasons have been identified to hamper the civil-military cooperation. Winslow (2002) 
recognized the five major ones to be: 
 differences in organizational structure and culture, 
 ways of solving the tasks, 
 the tasks themselves, 
 definition of success and time frames, and 
 ability to control information and the control of resources. 
Coning (2016, 22) sees some similarities in the hampering factors, some of them being 
differences in the values and principles, ways of implementing tasks, ways of understanding 
the best interest in the short- and long-term and how it corresponds to the 
comprehensiveness or just to the agency. Obviously by mitigating these hampering factors the 
cooperation might be enhanced. 
Coning (2012, 303; 2016, 22—23) also mentions that a forced cooperation might actually be 
counterproductive and decrease the cohesion between stakeholders. This is supported by 
Frerks et al. (2006, 8) by acknowledging that an effort to integrate the actions does exist but 
forced structures may be counterproductive. 
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According to Frerks et al. (2006, 8; 2016, 42), a flexible multi-level cooperation before the 
deployment might be one way to support the cooperation. Thynne and Cherne (2016, 74) and 
Lehtonen (2009) all agree by stating that achieving overall objectives demands for close 
interaction between the stakeholders. They highlight the meaning of joint training, education 
and exercises. This has been implemented by the peace operations personnel training 
centers. 
Information has been seen as a way to add interaction. This also means that the information 
flow to stakeholders without severe restrictions supports the possibility for cooperation 
through interaction (Coning 2012, 268; Seppen & Lucius 2016, 58). Also, understanding the 
information on what will likely happen if the cooperation is neglected might enhance the will 
to cooperate (Coning 2012, 262; Pohjanheimo 2012, 164—168).  
The understanding of overall objectives naturally enhances cohesion. The stakeholders need 
to see how they contribute to the strategic objective. The closer stakeholders can be 
voluntarily attached to the core, the better the cohesion. (Coning 2012, 263.) 
It has been argued that close ties with the stakeholders can be created and supported also by 
affecting the physical environment. This means having the offices and workplaces as close to 
each other as possible. (Seppen & Lucius 2016, 58.) One way of applying this could be 
arranging the offices so that the ones having, for instance, the same line of operations share 
the same building, the same floor or even the same office. This differentiates from the 
current way where stakeholders tend to have their own camps, bases and buildings. As the 
intra-agency cooperation is often more natural than the inter-agency cooperation, it might be 
something worth testing. This supports the idea of treating people as equals and, as a result 
creating a better understanding and trust between the stakeholders (Kitzen & Vogelsang 
2016, 87). This would enhance the capability to share information more efficiently. 
One identified challenge has been the militaries’ rotation cycle. It is seen to be too quick to 
establish natural relationships with the stakeholders. Basically, the relationship building 
starts from zero once or twice a year. (Frerks et al. 2006, 57.) This could be managed by 
introducing different rotation rhythms and planning the rotation on a personnel-level in a 
different way. 
From the leadership perspective, everything should be done to support the mutual trust and 
involving the stakeholders (Olsthoorn & Soeters 2016, 246). Leaders should have a mandate 
that allows flexibility to give them a better possibility to see and use the possibilities given to 
them on the ground (Frerks et al. 2006, 8). 
 48 
4.4 Summary 
Based on the literature, the stakeholders can be organized into groups as described in Figure 
9. The main groups are international organization and local and international stakeholders. 
International stakeholders include foreign stakeholders, i.e. states. 
 
Figure 9: Peace support operations’ stakeholders  
Each stakeholder has relations with others and therefore presenting them is difficult in a 
generic sense. In addition, the relations are in constant movement and dependent on the 
environment. Therefore, each case or operation should be assessed individually and the 
assessment is to be updated regularly. 
The ability of stakeholders to affect the operation is studied in section 6.5. Their power and 
interest related to operational lines will be assessed by professionals and a list of influential 
and willing stakeholders is presented. It needs to be understood that within a formed group 
lie many smaller groups causing variation within the group. 
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5 Methods and Timetable 
This section describes how the thesis was done. Firstly, the methods used are introduced and 
the reason for using them is argued. Secondly, the overall idea on how theory and practice is 
bonded together is introduced. Thirdly, the timetable is presented. 
5.1 Methods used to Answer the Research Questions 
This thesis is a survey study and it uses qualitative content analysis (Hirsijärvi, Remes & 
Sajavaara 2005, 125—125, 151—155, 182—183). The process from data collecting to analyzing 
and concluding is described below. 
Data Collection 
Three approaches to collect data were used. The first approach was through literature and 
articles. Second approach was a survey to experts and the third was interviewing experts. The 
data collected by these three approaches was triangulated to find the best possible solution. 
(Hirsijärvi et al. 2005, 180—208.) If data differentiated between the approaches, the cases 
were evaluated individually. 
Literature was primarily used to gain general information on the research topic. Articles were 
studied to find more specific information on some themes of the study. The value of the 
articles was considered critically. An effort was made to use the most updated data available 
which had been subdued to peer review. Several article databases, for instance Scopus, 
Laurea’s Finna, Finnish National Defence Force’s Linneanet and Google Scholar, were used to 
find material. 
Looking into current operations’ organigrams was avoided during the data collecting. This was 
done to minimize the possibility of finding solutions from wrong places. 
Survey was selected to be the main source of empiricism. This was done to reach as many 
potential experts around the world as possible. Survey was a suitable way to collect data with 
the designed questions and to enable the analysis right after collection. A positive side was 
that every respondent received the information as it was and therefore they had as similar 
details to answer the survey as possible. If the data had been collected by face to face 
interviews the answers would have been more versatile due to the nature of conversation. 
Surveys enabled the respondents to answer the questions whenever and wherever. The survey 
was planned so that the total time consumption per respondent would be around an hour 
divided into five parts. 
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Survey Introduction 
The survey was conducted in five rounds following the progress of the data collected from the 
literature. Each round consisted of 1—10 questions taking a total of 5—20 minutes to answer. 
The espondents were given 2—4 weeks to answer each round. Each respondent answered by 
using his or her own digital devices in a self-selected location. The survey, as a whole, was 
conducted within a year.  
The respondents were selected by their experience. The total number of people given the 
possibility to participate was nearly sixty. The people participating in each round varied from 
eight to sixteen. Each round had partly different respondents. To mitigate the effects on the 
results, the rounds were independent and each had their own theme. 
 
Figure 10: Demonstration of the survey rounds 
The survey’s idea is demonstrated in Figure 10. The respondents did not know of each other 
during the survey. They could suggest a new person to participate but they could not find out 
if that person participated or not. The raw data was given to the respondents after each 
round and they could comment on it. They were not given the information of which answer 
each participant had given. The aim was not to create unity but to find opinions on the 
subjects.  
This had similarities related to the Delfi-method. The respondents might have had an idea of 
each other participating and analyzing was done by qualitative content analysis and not by 
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the group itself. However, unity of opinion was not demanded in the end and therefore it was 
different from Delfi. Delfi-method was considered to be used in this study but it was assessed 
to be too burdensome and time-consuming for this occasion.  
The answers were collected and analyzed by Webropol-tools in the internet. A thorough 
description of the questions is given in section 6 and in Appendix 2. 
The interviews were conducted by e-mail. E-mail interviews were structured and usually 
related to some details where additional information was needed. 
The survey participants were treated anonymously and their answers cannot be connected to 
their identity. The selected people had top level experience on peace operations and working 
with the stakeholders. They were from international organizations and governmental 
organizations. Unfortunately, none were from non-governmental organizations. The 
respondents had years of experience from civilian and/or military peace operations. A 
detailed respondent information is provided in Appendix 1. 
Analyzing Methods 
The analyzing method used was qualitative content analysis. Analyzing was done by two 
approaches to validate the information. The two approaches were content isolation in 
numerical sense and content analysis in a qualitative sense. The principles of data collection 
and analysis are presented in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Data collecting and analyzing 
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This paragraph introduces the qualitative content analysis. The data collected from sources 
has been isolated in fragments and thematized. The thematized data was connected and 
developed into information. (Hirsijärvi et al. 2005, 209—215.) In this stage the sections were 
individual so that no connections were made between them. After this, the information was 
analyzed and conclusions were made. From the conclusions, it was possible to develop 
knowledge and answer the research question. 
This paragraph introduces the content isolation. The data collected was analyzed by text-
mining tools. The automatic analyze informed which words were often seen close to each 
other. After this all the answers were read one by one and each of them was categorized 
under its main theme e.g. lack of cooperation. A word-group was created below each theme. 
The program automatically calculated the number of times an individual theme was 
mentioned within the answers. This gave an idea of which themes were dominant or 
submissive in the answers. 
The content isolation and qualitative content analysis were used as separate tools. The 
isolation was always secondly used following the qualitative analysis. Since the analysis was 
made by the same person, it is possible that the isolation has been affected by the qualitative 
analysis. 
5.2 Dialogue between the Theory and Empiricism 
This thesis is based on an idea that one part leads to another. Therefore, one finding is a 
building block for the next one. This is introduced in Figure 12.  
Firstly, in the first theory part an idea of peace operations was studied and its success factors 
were established based on theory. The success factors were closely tied to operational lines. 
Secondly, a draft structure for a peace operation was created and possible risks towards the 
operation were identified by the survey rounds 1—3. Risks were assessed to be the failure 
factors towards the operation. The risks were identified, categorized manually and their root 
cause was established by five-whys tool. Thirdly, as an individual theory, the organizational 
theories and organizational success enablers were studied in the second theory part. Based on 
literature, 24 principles were selected to be most suitable for the organization of a peace 
operations. Fourthly, the 24 presented principles were subdued to peace operation experts. 
They were to assess how important a principle is and how often it occurs in relation to peace 
operations. Based on the answers, the key principles to establish the organization were 
found. Fifthly, the stakeholders to be involved into the organization were studied through 
theory. Through this phase, it was possible to determine the stakeholder groups present in 
peace operations. Sixthly, the respondents were to assess the power and interest of the 
stakeholders in relation to each operational line. The guidance was to conduct the assessment 
based on their views of the stakeholder performing at its realistic best. The assessment was 
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done by pointing a place on a fourhold which had interest on X-axis and power on Y-axis. The 
results were scaled to numbers between 1 and 100. The averages were used when forming 
charts. In this phase, the most influential and willing stakeholder groups were recognized. By 
this recognition, the ones that should be involved in the operation’s organization can be 
pointed out. 
 
Figure 12: Interaction between theory and survey rounds 
The main themes for the rounds were: 
 First round: Defining the strategy and end-state of comprehensive approaches. 
 Second round: Defining the operational lines for the operation. 
 Third round: Defining the risks related to reaching the end-state. 
 Third round: Finding applicable organizational theories to be implemented into peace 
operation. 
 Fifth round: Defining the applicable stakeholders’ power and interest to participate 
into peace operations. 
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Each survey round consisted of two parts. The first part was a collection of background 
information and the second was based on the selected theme. Anonymized basic information 
is presented in Appendix 1 and the format of the overall survey is presented in Appendix 2. 
The number of respondents in the survey rounds was low so the results are not statistically 
significant and therefore the data is analyzed by qualitative content analysis. In addition, 
statistical methods such as averages were utilized. One needs to understand that the numbers 
presented are merely descriptive and provide an idea of the tools used. 
After the argued organizational model was created it was subdued to evaluation. This is 
called the “Devil’s Advocate” method. The aim is to understand the weaknesses, problems 
and negative aspects of the model. (Lewis, Goodman & Fant 1995, 200—201.) A possibility to 
comment was given to all survey respondents and interviewed persons and their opinions are 
taken into consideration as a part of the criticism.  
5.3 Timetable to Answer the Research Questions 
The timetable is presented in Figure 13. Data collection and analysis was done within 2016. 
Reporting was started within 2016 and concluded together with evaluation in 2017. 
In the beginning of 2016, a project plan to conduct the thesis was established. The need for 
the research task was identified by IECEU project and confirmed by theoretical and empirical 
approaches within the first half of the year 2016. The research task was further developed to 
be a research question and divided into three sub-question pairs in early 2016. Each pair had 
an individual theme. The theory of these themes was studied in its equivalent section. Data 
collecting for the theory sections was started immediately after the sub-questions were 
established.  
 
Figure 13: Timeline and data collection 
As shown in Figure 13, the empirical part followed the theory collecting of each equivalent 
section. Each survey round was a separate one partly answering a particular sub-question. 
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The conclusions were made during the last quarter of 2016. Finalizing the report was 
conducted between November 2016 and January 2017. 
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6 Survey: Bonding Theory to Peace Operation Practice 
This section presents the survey round by round. Each round is studied in its own sub-section. 
Firstly, a reason for the survey round is presented. Secondly, the findings and analyzed data 
are presented in a table and figure format. The findings of the qualitative content analysis 
are seen underlined in the tables. Content isolation is introduced in the figures together with 
the used word groups. Rounds from one to three were analyzed as described above. Rounds 
four and five were adapted into numerical data and therefore averages are used. The 
averages are considered to be descriptions of the outcome. Since the number of respondents 
was low, the averages are not to be considered as absolute values. 
6.1 First Round: Comprehensiveness in Peace Operations 
First round searched for a clarification on the terms commonly used for comprehensive crisis 
management and a view to the end-state of an operation. This was deemed necessary in 
order to establish a common ground for the following rounds and to build up the basic 
structure of an operation. The basic information of the respondents is presented in Appendix 
1. The number of respondents was 16 in the first round. 
6.1.1 First round: Defining Strategy and End-state for a Peace Operation 
The answers related to comprehensive crisis management and comprehensive approach 
appear to be mixed with each other. No clear distinction can be drawn between them. For 
instance, the answers of ID 1, ID 8 and ID 10 on question one compared to those of ID 9 and 
ID14 to question two have many similarities. See Table 7 for more details. As it was presented 
earlier in the second section, crisis management has had many generations and many terms 
exist. They are easily mixed up, especially when organizations have a similar idea but they 
use an individual term for it. For instance, comprehensive approach is a term related to the 
European Union’s crisis prevention and management. The term was recognized by one 
respondent (Survey, Question 2-ID 9). 
A wide definition was adopted for this thesis because it was needed in order to include 
aspects of state-building. Based on answers on questions one and two, the idea of 
comprehensive crisis management was defined as connecting important stakeholders to 
achieve a common goal by using all relevant capabilities in all phases of the crisis as 
mentioned in Table 7. 
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Q1: What does Comprehensive Crisis 
Management mean to you? 
Q2: What does Comprehensive Approach 
mean to you? 
ID 1: 
“All the actions taken together to help and 
support people in need.” 
ID 3: 
“All the possible elements as well as means 
are taken into consideration and they most 
appropriate of them taken into use.” 
ID 8: 
“Comprehensive Crisis Management means 
… coordination and interoperability 
between different actors and crisis 
management Instruments […] at ALL stages 
of engagement in a post-conflict or crisis 
situation […]” 
ID 9: 
“All possible stakeholders (civilians, 
military, politicians) should participate to 
the effort […]” 
ID 10: 
“Combining and integrating vast range of 
tools, means and expertise in order to 
support a nation or region to cope a 
security crisis. Also the goals are widely 
spread throughout the society and 
administration in the crisis region.” 
ID 14: 
“Comprehensive approach is a means to 
develop a coordination and response to a 
crisis by all relevant actors involved.” 
 
Table 7: A sample of collected answers on questions 1 and 2 (Survey 2016, Q1—Q2) 
Answers on the third question highlighted the end-state to be a sustainable peace, 
achievemtn of a functioning society and a limited need for international support (Survey 
2016, Q3). This is clearly stated in the answers introduced below: 
“A functioning society where people basic needs are taken care of and where 
we have a functioning administration to support the people, so that they have 
safe environment.” (Survey 2016, Round 1, Question 3, ID 2.) 
“State structures have been established and they are able to work 
professionally with a limited international assistance.” (Survey 2016, Round 1, 
Question 3, ID 3.) 
“[…] a situation where the institutions of the country in question can take care 
of their own functioning, provide the necessary services for their own people, 
are free from interference by outsiders, where the basic human rights of the 
people can be guaranteed by the institutions and services and where a certain 
degree of human security is in place.” (Survey 2016, Round 1, Question 3, ID 8.) 
The results were connected to theory from the third section and are presented in the Figure 
15. 
As mentioned in methods section, the data was also analyzed by content isolation. Based on 
the isolation it can be argued that questions one and two had similarities. The most often 
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mentioned themes, i.e. word groups, were “all stakeholders”, “all actions” and “common 
goals”. This finding supports the definition of comprehensive crisis management introduced 
above. 
  
Figure 14: Content isolation of questions 1—3 (Survey 2016) 
Based on the content isolation of the third question, the themes, i.e. word groups, that were 
most often mentioned were limited international support, functioning society and sustainable 
peace. This is directly supporting the qualitative analysis conducted and presented above. 
6.2 Second Round: Peace Operation’s Operational Lines 
The second round presented a suggestion for the selected strategy and end-state to the 
respondents and gave them a possibility to comment. The suggestions were developed based 
on the first round and are presented in Figure 15. Based on the suggestions, the respondents 
were to define the lines of operation, i.e. areas of interest. Respondents had the possibility 
to name as many as they wanted. The basic information of the respondents is presented in 
Appendix 1. The number of respondents was 14. 
 59 
 
Figure 15: Suggested end-state and strategy (Survey 2016) 
6.2.1 Assessing the End-state, Strategy and Defining the Operational Lines 
The suggested end-state and strategy were commonly seen as suitable but still received 
critique of being too vague. Some answers related to the critique are presented below: 
 “End-state is unrealistic and too vaste […]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, 
ID 6.) 
“The End State is clear and even somehow measurable to assess the 
achievements of the operation, but still it is rather generic. I would have 
preferred a more precise End state. The same goes for the described strategy 
[…]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 10.) 
“The end state is much too ambitious and all-inclusive for any mission / 
operation to be able to fulfil within its mandate, resources or time. It includes 
basically the whole state building of a post-conflict state including political, 
social, security and governance development […] Strategy, too, is rather 
ambiguous[…]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 18.) 
ID 18 presents critique towards the suggestions by mentioning that it includes all the aspects 
of state-building. This can be argued to be a positive critique since a generic model was the 
aim.  
The respondent ID 13 highlighted that the operation is not black and white and many shades 
of grey exist. Therefore, it needs to be understood that each situation is different and the 
aim for this round was to develop as generic a model as possible. The broad model was used 
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to avoid missing crucial factors during the upcoming rounds. ID 13’s answer is presented 
below. 
“The end-state is not a binary decision: yes or no, 0 or 1, black or white. It's 
rather a set of shades of gray […]” (Survey 2016, Round 2, Question 4, ID 13.) 
A total of 118 operational lines were suggested. Answers were separated and themed under 
generalized operational lines. The analysis was done manually and by content isolation. The 
result of the analysis is introduced in Figure 16. The lines are generalized so that some 
include two lines. This was done to keep the survey rounds less time consuming and 
burdensome for the respondents. 
 
Figure 16: End-state, Strategy and Operational lines combined by manual analysis 
The data was also analyzed with content isolation to test the outcome of the manual analysis. 
The information is presented in Figure 17. Each line presents a theme, i.e. word groups which 
are presented in the same figure. The most common ones were security, management, 
governance, development and political system. Since some generalization and merging was 
done in the manual analysis, the result can be seen to support it. The content isolation also 
indicates the importance of separate operational lines. Security can be argued to be one of 
the most important ones. Merging governance and political system raises it to be among the 
most important ones. Nevertheless, one needs to remember that the result is merely 
describing the importance and the respondents were not asked to assess the importance. 
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 Figure 17: Content isolation of question 5 (Survey 2016) 
6.3 Third Round: Risks in Peace Operations 
Third round introduced the operational lines to the respondents in the form as they were 
mentioned in Figure 16. The respondents were given a task to identify the risks that might 
hamper the overall mission success. The respondents had the possibility to name as many as 
they wanted. The information of respondents is presented in Appendix 1. The number of 
respondents was 9. 
6.3.1 Third Round: Root Causes to Hamper the Operational Success 
The respondents recognized 76 risks. The categorization was done manually and by content 
isolation as shown in Figure 18. After the categorization was done, each risk was assessed by 
using a tool called five-whys4. By this, the most crucial risks were identified to be 
stakeholders’ own interests, lack of training for the stakeholders, the situation not 
comprehensively understood, focusing on the short-term, too cautious an attitude towards 
action and the multicultural environment as a whole. 
                                                 
4 Five-whys is a common tool to understand the root cause of something. Addressing the origi-
nal problem by asking why it occurs and repeating it for the answer for total of five times one 
is closer to the root cause. 
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Figure 18: Risk categorization by content isolation (Survey 2016, Q6) 
The identified risks and the root causes are used to support the forming of an organization. 
Some risks can be mitigated by organizational design. For instance, deciding jointly upon the 
strategic objectives will increase the level of commitment. This can be seen as positive in the 
context of stakeholders having their own agenda and of the overall lack of situational 
awareness. 
6.4 Fourth Round: Applying Organization Theories to Peace Operations 
The fourth round introduced factors from organizational theories and peace operations 
literature. The respondents were to assess how important a factor is and how often it occurs 
in peace operations. Each question had two parts: A. for importance and B. for occurrence. 
The assessment was done by using numbers from 1 to 5 and averages were used to create the 
charts. The respondents were given a possibility to comment on the selected factors. The 
fourth round had 8 respondents. The numeric data is not absolute and the numbers presented 
are to be understood as a description of the situation. Nevertheless, the conclusions are used 
to support the forming of an organization. 
The factors were themed under the following categories: 
 Strategy and objectives: Q7.1—Q7.5 
 Local ownership and host nation: Q7.6—Q7.10 
 Evolving organization: Q7.11, Q7.21 
 Pooling, sharing and cooperation: Q7.12—Q7.15, Q7.22 
 Organization: Q7.16—Q7.20, Q7.23—Q7.24 
 63 
6.4.1 Fourth Round: Organizational Factors’ Importance and Occurrence  
The assessed factors are presented in order of importance in Figure 19. Almost all the 
selected factors were assessed to be very or extremely important although none was assessed 
to occur often in operations. Therefore, they are introduced into the organization’s structure 
in order of thematized importance presented in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 19: Importance and occurrence of selected factors (Survey 2016, Q7) 
The respondents were given a possibility to comment on the factors presented. The 
comments were analyzed by qualitative content analysis. Content isolation was not used since 
only 5 respondents had commented. Some comments are introduced in the following 
paragraphs. 
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Figure 20: Importance and occurrence of themes (Survey 2016, Q7) 
As evolving organization in Figure 20 is ranked the highest in importance the first result is 
that the organization needs to able to evolve in the environment. This is clearly indicated by 
the factors 11 and 21 in Figure 19. It is worth noticing that evolving organization ranks highest 
in the occurrence while the occurrence of follow-up is more rare. This result was supported 
by an expert commenting on the issue: 
 “[…] it is also important that the operation is adaptable to the changing 
environment […] changes in roles, responsibilities, and sub-objectives during 
the operation cycle is necessary.” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 20) 
The second result is that the stakeholders need to be able to participate to the strategy and 
objective establishment to better function as a team. This includes that the objectives need 
to be clearly stated top-down. This is supported by factors 1—5 in Figure 19. The occurrence 
of stating the objectives top-down was the only factor in this category assessed to occur more 
often than sometimes, receiving a value of 3.25. The rest were assessed to occur between 
sometimes and rarely.  
The third result argues that local environment needs to have an influence on the actions as 
well as its capability needing to be developed at all times. One of the largest variations was 
within this category. The importance varied from 3.4 to 4.6 and the occurrence from 2.63 to 
3.13. The lowest rank in importance was assessed to be factor 7, meaning building the 
organization on the principles of the host nation. This can be interpreted so that in some 
level the western organization models are seen adaptable. Since the occurrence of all the 
factors in this category are close to value 3 it can be argued that some ways to reach 
effectiveness are available and some can be implemented through organization. 
The fourth result is that different levels of interaction between stakeholders is essential. This 
is visible in the factors 14 and 15 in Figure 19. It is interesting that the occurrence of this 
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category is the lowest when considering the average. One interesting detail is that factor 12, 
meaning the stakeholders to perform as one, was ranked second lowest on importance 
reaching a value of 3.4. This category indicates that interaction and even sharing resources 
should be done more efficiently but the stakeholders can perform individually. This theme 
was commented on by experts: 
 “Cooperation shall take place where appropriate […] Capability to manage and 
lead the complexity should be at the heart […]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, 
Question 8, ID 20) 
 “[…] Stakeholder participation supports good governance, citizenship, and 
accountability and promotes innovation, responsiveness, and sustainability, 
linked directly to development effectiveness […]” (Survey 2016, Round 4, 
Question 8, ID 14) 
 “[…] Narrow-minded, black and white leadership effectively hindered 
cooperation exceeding agency boundaries and, thus, greater efficiency of the 
organization/operation […]“(Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 15) 
The fifth result is that the organization should utilize all different forms of organizing and the 
unity of command is not crucial. Factors 16, 17 and 18 in Figure 19 support the idea of having 
strategic alliances, communities and networks. Factor 24, meaning having a clear unity of 
command, was assessed to be least important among all the factors, reaching a value of 2.71 
on importance. Factor 20 is interesting since it recognizes the need to share information 
openly but simultaneously ranks second lowest on occurrence by reaching a value of 2.25. 
This result is supported by an expert by stating: 
 “[…] Partnerships with more diverse institutions including NGOs, community-
based organizations, and foundations will become central to planning, 
financing, and implementing operations […]“(Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, 
ID 14) 
 “Matrix management is sometimes the best option […]”(Survey 2016, Round 4, 
Question 8, ID 11) 
It is worth noticing factors 3, 5, 20 and 22 in Figure 19. Firstly, they indicate that joint 
development of high level objectives is extremely important and understanding the objectives 
enhances cooperation. Secondly, it is recognized that it is very important to plan, conduct 
and follow actions together with all the stakeholders. Thirdly, the open flow of information 
was assessed to be very important. The factors mentioned are the lowest ranking in their 
occurrence, reaching values from 2.25 to 2.5. It can be argued that the occurrence of the 
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mentioned factors is intertwined with each other. By conducting joint planning, the 
information flow will be enhanced, the objectives will be better understood, the will to 
cooperate enhances and together these contribute to the will to jointly plan, conduct and 
follow the actions. This was supported by an expert: 
 “[…] Joint Planning, Information sharing and effective cooperation among 
stakeholders need to be improved!” (Survey 2016, Round 4, Question 8, ID 14) 
6.5 Fifth Round: The power and interest of the stakeholders 
The fifth round introduced the stakeholders based on literature and on a modified approach 
to operational lines. The modification was based on the the answers from the second round 
and on literature. This section introduces the stakeholders to be implemented into each 
operational line based on their power and interest. The fifth round had 9 respondents and 
they are introduced in Appendix 1. One needs to understand that the results are only 
describing the idea and contributing by introducing the stakeholder groups. The numbers 
presented are based on averages and are not absolute. The results were used to support the 
organization forming.  
6.5.1 Fifth Round: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards operational lines 
By understanding the stakeholders in the environment, one can map them. This can be 
utilized to understand the complex nature of the environment. By studying the stakeholders 
and assessing them, the ones enabling success can be found. It needs to be understood that 
most of the groups presented below are not actual stakeholders. Each stakeholder agency or 
organization is an individual and their power and interest differs greatly within the group they 
represent. For instance, local people can be further divided into smaller groups based on e.g. 
ethnicity or religion (Tsvetkov 2016). 
The power and interest of stakeholders in relation to each operational line is presented 
below. The power and interest related to management is introduced on the left in Figure 21. 
The figure is sorted based on power. The one having the highest power is presented on the 
top and the one with lowest power is on the bottom. The level of interest related to the 
operational line is expressed side by side with the power on the left side of the Figure 21. 
As mentioned above, the stakeholders can be mapped if they are properly assessed. One way 
to map the stakeholders is presented on the right in side of Figure 21. The figure shows the 
ranking of the stakeholders based on power and interest. The high ranking ones are placed on 
the top in Figure 21. The colors are used to visualize the same stakeholders. The shades are 
presenting similar groups where blue ones are international groups, yellow ones are local and 
red ones are possibly having a negative effect on the situation. By analyzing Figure 21, one 
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can find out the crucial stakeholder groups related to management. In this thesis, the crucial 
ones were deemed to be the ones with power and the ones whose power should be enhanced 
to enable sustainable peace, e.g. local governmental organizations. 
 
Figure 21: The power and interest of stakeholders towards management (Survey 2016, Q24) 
Based on Figure 21 one can argue that three most powerful stakeholders on management are 
the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. They are all international organizations. 
The following three are local groups of spoilers, conflict parties and political elite. The three 
most interested stakeholders are the United Nations, the European Union and OSCE. They are 
all international organizations as well, but when reflected towards power factor, NATO is 
assessed to have much lower level of interest towards the management than the other high 
ranking entities on power factor. Places 4—6 on interest factor are again local groups and, to 
be specific, local governmental organizations, people and political elite. It is worth noticing 
that local people rank low on power but quite high on interest. A similar argument can be 
made on local companies and local non-governmental organizations. Another issue worth 
mentioning is that if the international groups are not present, three out of five most powerful 
stakeholders are possibly having a negative effect on the situation. This needs to be 
considered when establishing the organization. As an exception in this operational line, the 
possibly negative stakeholders have a high interest towards management. 
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Figure 22: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards security and rule of law 
(Survey 2016, Q12) 
As Figure 22 presents, most of the stakeholders with high interest tend to have low power 
within this operational line. The stakeholders acting in the root level in the local society, i.e. 
local people and local NGOs, seem to have the highest interest on the security and the rule of 
law. Potentially negatively affecting stakeholders have the lowest interest to contribute but 
they rank within the seven highest power holders in the listing. If this is not mitigated in an 
early stage, it will have an effect on the operation. When participating in the peace process, 
the possible negative stakeholders  might have a great effect on security and the rule of law. 
It must be understood that some individuals in the mentioned stakeholder groups might be a 
part of several groups e.g. within political elite there might be people who also belong to the 
spoilers or conflict parties groups. 
Another interesting factor in Figure 21 is the difference between NATO’s power and interest. 
NATO is considered to be the most powerful stakeholder and yet it ranks in the middle on 
interest. This line could easily be understood to be NATO’s core business within peace 
operations so the low interest level was not expected. 
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Figure 23: The power and interest of stakeholders towards governance and political system 
(Survey 2016, Q14) 
Figure 23 introduces the first presented operational line where the local stakeholder group 
ranks highest together with the United Nations. The differences are marginal. This 
operational line follows the previous ones in the sense that the possibly negative stakeholders 
have a high power but low interest. What is more, the local stakeholders having high interest 
tend to have low power.  
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Figure 24: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards development and economics 
(Survey 2016, Q20) 
A new factor on this operational line is the high power of foreign stakeholders e.g. companies 
and governmental organizations. Another issue is that the possibly negative stakeholders have 
fallen in the middle on power but they are still the lowest on interest. A positive factor is 
that if the international stakeholders are deleted from the charts, the high-ranking 
stakeholders are locals or at least possibly having a positive impact on the situation. On the 
other hand, it can be discussed whether the foreign companies have a positive or a negative 
impact on the development. The top two on power are clearly ahead of the others. This 
operational line and humanitarian aid are the only ones with such a clear difference. 
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Figure 25: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards human rights (Survey 2016, 16) 
The ones ranking high on power in relation to human rights tend to have a high variance on 
their interest. Based on Figure 23, it appears that the ones who are mostly affected by a poor 
human rights situation are the most interested in it. For instance, local political elite has high 
power but low interest. This could be because they probably are not the ones suffering from a 
poor situation and therefore are not interested in it. Another group which is clearly interested 
in human rights is the international community. This could be because honoring human rights 
is often one of their core values. A factor worth mentioning is that the companies, both local 
and foreign, are low on interest and power related to human rights issues. It was surprising 
how low the interest among the local companies is since local people and non-governmental 
organizations rank high on interest. 
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Figure 26: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards humanitarian aid (Survey 2016, 
Q18) 
The United Nations and the European Union have clearly the highest power towards 
humanitarian aid, as seen from Figure 26. Otherwise the operational line follows the typical 
theme where the ones suffering the consequences of the crisis are very interested but low on 
power. The possible negative stakeholders are ranking in the middle on power but a small 
distinction can be made since the local spoilers and conflict parties have more power than 
foreign entities. One factor worth mentioning is the low power of foreign people and their 
average interest on the situation. It can be argued that the lack of information decreases the 
interest of the people and lack of means to contribute decreases the power factor. If a tool to 
contribute existed and people would receive more correct information from the area this 
group’s potential would be much higher. 
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Figure 27: The power and interest of the stakeholders towards media and civil society (Survey 
2016, Q22) 
Media and civil society is the operational line which has the highest level of interest as a 
whole. It can be discussed whether the overall support on this operational line is a bit higher 
than towards the others. Still, the same trends apply on this line as well. 
Based on the findings from all the operational lines the following issues can be argued. 
Firstly, the United Nations and the European Union have a high influence on the success of 
the operation. Other international organizations’ influence varies more based on the 
operational line. Secondly, also the potentially negative stakeholders, e.g. spoilers and 
conflict parties, have a high influence on the success. This indicates that their capability to 
negatively affect the situation should be mitigated as soon as possible. By doing so the peace 
process has a better possibility to success. For instance, transforming the conflict parties into 
political parties is mentioned earlier to be an important factor to success. Thirdly, many 
stakeholders that function on the root level of the crisis tend to have low power but high 
interest. As stated earlier, building local capacity is argued to be important. This can be seen 
as a possibility to use means of teaching and mentoring to build up the capacity by the 
international community. 
To support the overall success, the ones ranking high on power and the ones who should carry 
the weight of the crisis in the end are to be in the lead of the operation. This combination is 
called a core in this thesis. The core can vary between operational lines and regionally but to 
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support the overall understanding of the objectives it is crucial that the ones leading are 
present in all levels and areas. 
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7 Developing the Organization for Peace Operation 
This section provides a suggestion for a peace operation organization. The organization will 
be developed based on the findings of sub-questions. A synthesis of theory and empiricism is 
introduced in this section. 
7.1 Synthesis of overall findings 
Research Questions Sections of 
discussion 
Short answer to research question 
1a. What is a peace 
operation? 
Section 2  
Section 6.1 
Combining all the stakeholders and their 
capabilities to achieve sustainable peace and a 
functioning society which needs only limited 
international support. 
1b. What are the agents 
of success in peace 
operations? 
Section 2  
Section 6.2 
Section 6.3 
Understanding the situation thoroughly and 
planning a solution together with crucial 
stakeholders on the basis of self-sustainable peace. 
All the implemented actions should build up local 
capacity to function as a nation and to move 
further from the possibility of relapse. 
1c. What is an 
organization? 
Section 3  
 
Organization is a description of e.g. authority, 
responsibility, structure, information flow and 
reporting. Organization always has a task to 
accomplish and it should be built to achieve it as 
efficiently as possible. 
1d. What kind of 
organization best 
supports interaction? 
Section 3 
Section 6.4 
Hybrid organization which inholds the main ideas 
of planning, acting and reviewing issues together. 
Supporting voluntary and self-emerging evolution 
of the organization is a positive factor. Open 
information flow is seen to support these issues.  
1e. Who are the 
stakeholders in a peace 
operation? 
Section 4 This has to be assessed case by case and a useful 
generic model is very hard to produce.  
 
The stakeholders can be divided into three main 
groups which are international organizations, local 
stakeholders and international stakeholders. These 
can be further divided into 20 groups. It needs to 
be understood that a successful operation must 
recognize the ones it needs to involve. 
1f. What are the power 
and interest of the 
stakeholders to affect an 
operation? 
Section 4 
Section 6.5 
The power and interest tends to vary based on the 
operational lines they were compared to. 
Commonly the ones who should be in charge were 
considered to be low on power and high on 
interest. The international organizations were 
often ranked high on power and interest. Possibly 
negatively affecting stakeholders tend to have high 
power but low interest. 
Table 8: Answers to research questions 
More thorough answers to sub-questions are delivered in the following paragraphs. 
Peace operations and enablers for success 
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Peace support operations have seen five generations to date (Kenkel 2013). The latest have 
been identified to be more complex than the earlier ones. It needs to be understood that 
each operation is implemented in a different environment and therefore is unique. The 
unique situation needs to be assessed comprehensively to meet the needs of the supported 
nation. 
The latest models of peace operations are based on system approach. It needs to be seen as a 
way to understand the situation more comprehensively. The causalities tend to work in 
unexpected ways and system approach should not be seen as a way to ensure success by 
design. It is impossible to foresee primary, secondary or tertiary effects of actions. 
One crucial aspect of inefficiency is argued to depend on the lack of coherence. This means 
that the actions are not coordinated in the most effective way causing ineffective use of 
resources and ineffectiveness in reaching goals. The ultimate consequence is prolongation of 
the crisis. 
This thesis addressed a situation in the most challenging environment where a comprehensive 
state building needs to be implemented. Therefore, the state-building’s structure was set as 
vast as possible and the organization was to be able to take the overall responsibility of the 
situation.  
Since the local capability to maintain sustainable peace is one crucial objective, their 
capability to manage the situation should be developed from the beginning. This demands for 
local will to achieve peace and, on the other hand, for international will to build local 
capacity so that it reaches a sufficient level. 
The mandate sets the fundamentals for the operation and gives guidelines for strategy 
development. The strategy is developed after the objectives have been set based on the 
mandate. To enable positive interaction between core stakeholders, they should be given the 
possibility to participate in the objective development and in the work before defining the 
objects. If the core stakeholders are not agreeing on the objectives it will be more difficult to 
enable positive and holistic approach in the operation. 
Organizational enablers for success 
Several factors to be considered in the organization forming were found. The most crucial 
factors are presented in the following paragraphs together with a suggestion on how they 
should be implemented in the organization. 
The first factor was to mitigate the will of the stakeholders to pursue objectives related to 
their own interests. This can be done by joint development of common objectives. Another 
way is to enable their own interest-based objectives to be connected to the overall actions in 
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a functioning manner. By this, the rate of all the actions and projects being connected to the 
overall objectives should rise. The third way to mitigate this is to make sure that everyone 
understands the results of the conducted actions based on their own interest, i.e. prolonging 
the crisis. 
The second factor was to mitigate lack of training among the stakeholders. This causes them 
to work inefficiently together and to not see the environment as a crucial actor. It is obvious 
that joint training should be a part of the culture and that in the long run this would 
contribute to the situation. When a “performing as one” ideology is implemented, it requires 
the stakeholders to understand and respect each others. One critical way to engage this is 
enabling and making interaction and making stakeholders to work with each other. 
The third factor is defective knowledge of the situation. Without information, the knowledge 
cannot be developed. Therefore, a crucial way towards a better knowledge is sharing 
information. This can be supported by organizational structures which are argued to increase 
the information flow. Another way to support information flow is to establish information 
networks which are openly spread throughout the area. This would enable the ones with 
access to reach more data and information and therefore have a possibility to understand the 
situation better and possibly contribute to it. Obviously, the information sharing includes risks 
as well. 
The fourth factor is to develop a self-correcting organization. This can be understood to be an 
evolutionary method to alter the organization based on the needs. The organization’s 
evolution needs to be based on voluntary actions from stakeholders and different levels of 
interaction. 
The fifth factor is to understand that the structure of large organizations tends to be a hybrid 
of several organization types. This supports the operation’s versatile needs. 
Interaction and relations as enablers for success 
Operations have many stakeholders and therefore it is not useful to name most of them since 
they are different in each operation. In this thesis, the main groups were categorized to be 
international organizations, local stakeholders and international stakeholders. 
Each stakeholder has relations to the ones it interacts with regardless of the interaction level. 
The relations vary according to the environment. It is a complex task to define the true 
relations and therefore only a generic idea of the relations is introduced in this thesis. 
The power and interest of the stakeholders to affect the operation varies greatly. A generic 
model implies that an operation needs core stakeholders which are responsible for achieving 
the common objectives. The core should be developed bearing in mind that the locals have a 
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high level of interest to the situation and, in the end, they are the ones to achieve 
sustainable peace. The other part of the core needs to be the ones who have power to 
support the local interest. In the implementation phase, the core can be developed from 
international actors but locals should be adopted as soon as possible. 
7.2 Argued presentation of the organigram 
This section introduces examples of how the ideas presented earlier can be adapted into the 
organization. The ideas are core establishment, voluntary interaction, evolving structure and 
education. 
 
Figure 28: Operation’s generic core5 
By conducting a stakeholder analysis, one can define the stakeholders who need to be in the 
core. In a generic sense, the United Nations, local union, NATO, local political elite, local 
governmental organizations, local non-governmental organizations, conflict parties and 
spoilers can be included. The generic core is presented in Figure 28. The one in command is 
the strongest international union or the local administration. One idea implemented into the 
core is to support local capacity building from the early stages. By this, the stakeholders who 
shall carry the responsibility in the end are considered. It also aims to develop their 
capabilities in the sense of mentoring and liaising. Coning (2012, 310) argues that significant 
                                                 
5 The example time is based on following calculations. UN has had 69 operations to date. 16 
of those are ongoing. Average length of the ended operations is 3.5 years. When counting only 
the ones that have ended after the year 2000 the average length is 6 years. The average of 
the 11 ongoing 4-5th generation operations is 10 years and they are still ongoing. (United Na-
tions, 2013a) 
 79 
change in command structure needs to be done when the situation evolves from pacification 
towards state building. 
The second idea is to support the transformation of the the warring factions into political 
parties, which can be comprehended to be a part of the demobilization process. The third 
idea is to mitigate the powerful stakeholders who have a negative attitude towards the peace 
process. For instance, the spoilers create a risk for the success and therefore they need to be 
addressed as soon as possible. The fourth idea is that the core can be established in many 
levels of the organization e.g. on regional and provincial levels. 
Voluntary interaction is based on the will of the stakeholders to contribute. The interaction 
can have different levels from unity to competing (Coning & Friis 2011, 253—261). The 
stakeholders should be treated in a way that the competitive relations decrease. Figure 29 
introduces a model to understand the voluntary-based thinking. It merely shows examples of 
the relations and it should be interpreted so that the end of the arrow shows the 
stakeholder’s attitude at the starting point. All the operational lines have a core which is 
connected to the other stakeholders. Voluntary interaction enables the organizations to be 
dynamic by nature. The arrows can also be understood to be information flows. In that case, 
an information system should be adapted to support the information flow. The principle is 
that everything should be accessible to everyone since information adds to the level of 
interaction and to the overall understanding. This is suggested to be a topic for a new study. 
 
Figure 29: Voluntary interaction and information flow 
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The state level organization is introduced in Figure 30. The idea is that the state level is 
managed by the core and supported by the ones capable and willing. To support the 
understanding of main objectives, the state-wide stakeholders are suggested to participate on 
regional levels as well. This does not mean that all the stakeholders need to be identical on 
different levels. The need of certain stakeholders can also vary between regions and based on 
the environment and the situation. The state level organization can be understood to be an 
adaptive division structure which utilizes networks. If the regions are identical the division 
structures resemble each other but the network is based on the actors available. 
 
Figure 30: State level organization 
On a regional level, the operational lines are presented and each of them has a member in 
the management core. Individual lines develop their own cores and networks surrounding 
them. Features of the matrix organization can be delivered, for instance, through evaluation 
and logistics. To support the self-emerging of the networks, an information flow must be 
supported internationally by technical means and capabilities. 
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Figure 31: Regional level organization 
The overall organization suggestion is presented in Figure 32. It does not consider the levels 
of interaction but merely describes the command and reporting hierarchy. The overall idea of 
the networks is not described as a whole. The network can be utilized from the state level to 
the local level. For instance, the state level management core can use stakeholders within 
the network to support the evaluation and planning work. It is good to understand that actors 
within the network are not necessarily interested in regions or other geographical areas since 
province, region or district boundaries tend to be invisible and they can function on both 
sides. 
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Figure 32: Organization chart for the operation 
The idea of networks is that all the parties accessing the information can voluntarily 
contribute to it. The stakeholder does not need to be tied into any specific action. It can 
contribute to reaching the main objectives by participating into projects designed to support 
the main objectives in the first hand. 
To clarify the idea of local level actors, Figure 33 was created. An actor needs to be 
responsible to achieve commonly decided objectives. That actor is positioned into the 
management area. A security core should be established of the most influential people in the 
area in relation to all the actors. Both these groups have embedded mentors and trainers. 
The security actors are the actual executors of the tasks. The network is formed of every 
stakeholder that can be utilized to achieve objectives more efficiently. 
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Figure 33: Organization for the local security operations 
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8 Conclusions 
This section presents the main findings of the thesis and the need for follow-up studies and 
presents an estimation of the reliability and validity of this thesis. 
8.1 Findings of the Study 
Peace operations terms 
Many terms related to peace operations exist. The terms vary based on the organization 
studied. Some of the terms differ but, basically, they are trying to achieve similar issues. The 
term peace operation should include all the aspects of delivering sustainable peace into a 
selected state from planning to evaluating the actions. This is the reason why it was used in 
this thesis. Other terms such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building, peace 
support operations, hybrid operations, integrated operations, multi-dimensional operations 
and comprehensive approach to operations are describing a more specific event or a way to 
implement an operation. 
Organizational factors supporting cohesion 
The access to information is a crucial part of working towards common strategic objectives. 
When stakeholders are within an information sharing community, they have access to 
contributing to the operation as well as sharing their information and resources when 
interested. Core stakeholders, i.e. the ones having power and interest together with the ones 
whose capability should be built, should be within the information community as soon as 
possible. They should also contribute to it. Joint planning, implementing and evaluating 
actions will enhance the level of understanding the strategic objectives. By understanding, it 
is easier to see oneself as a part of the whole operation. Therefore, information is needed to 
reach a holistic approach and more efficiently perform as one. 
Coning (2012, 106) argues that the assumption of a higher level of coherence is directly 
related to flawed efficiency. It is seen to work until a certain level after which the effects 
are unpredictable. In this thesis, the possibility of unwanted outcomes is mitigated through 
voluntary-based interaction. 
Stakeholders in operations 
Each operation is unique. When starting the fact finding, it is important to recognize the 
stakeholders within the area. That is the only way to involve them in the operation. 
International organizations are usually the same everywhere. This refers to, for instance, the 
United Nations, NATO and regional unions such as EU and AU. The local and international 
stakeholders are the ones that need to be carefully considered. By understanding their 
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dynamics, the correct ones are more likely to be addressed. The stakeholders can be divided, 
for instance, based on their functions, their objectives and their geographical operation area 
or level. This thesis presented generalized stakeholders which should be divided into smaller 
groups in a real situation. For instance, local population can be divided based on their 
ethnicity, religion or living area. Only after thorough recognition, can they be assessed and 
understood. 
Applying stakeholder analysis to organization building 
Previously, analyzing stakeholders has been used in assessments done after or during the 
crisis. In this thesis, it was used as a tool to recognize the stakeholders to be involved in the 
operational lines of peace operations. After recognizing the stakeholders, some analysis has 
to be done. A stakeholder analysis was deemed to be one useful application. By finding the 
ones with suitable capabilities towards the operational lines, one can establish a core group 
for the operation. The analysis should be revised from time to time to make sure the correct 
stakeholders are involved.  
Key issues in building up the organization 
It is important that the organization evolves according to the changes in the environment and 
in the situation. The structure itself is less important and it should be based on need and 
therefore on the mandate. Core stakeholders should be present in as many levels as possible 
to support the overall understanding of the strategic objectives. It can be argued that the 
closer to the root level the stakeholders are operating the more the operation’s organization 
should be based on self-emerging and voluntary based communities and networks. 
8.2 Need for Follow-up Studies 
Success Factors of 21st Century Peace Operations 
The first recognized need for a follow-up is a reproduction of Stedman’s study. Since the 
operations are more complex today than they were prior to the new millennium, the current 
operations should be evaluated the same way. The outcome would be an assessment of 
operations between 2000—2016 to better understand the factors of complex operations and 
their negative and positive drivers. Simultaneously, it could be assessed whether the 
operations have been successes or failures. 
Pre-mission training in support of all-stakeholder cohesion in Peace Operations 
the second suggestion is related to the joint training. Based on the findings of this study, one 
can argue that pursuing common objectives needs interaction, mutual respect and knowledge 
of each other. The better the stakeholders know each other the easier it is for them to 
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interact. This can be supported by pre-mission training. In optimal situations, the people 
deployed to operations should be trained together. The suggested research task is to plan 
how a multi-stakeholder pre-mission training should be conducted in order to support the 
achievement of common objectives in the mission area. 
Comprehensive Information Concept in Peace Operations 
The third suggestion is about the information flow. It has been argued that information adds 
interaction and enables objective achievement. The suggested research tasks would be to 
define the requirements and develop a concept for the system. Also, technical aspects could 
be studied. This would be a potential way to support the information flow. Aspects to be 
included in the study could be the needed devices, possibilities to use crowd funding in 
project implementations and information management as a whole. For instance, the system 
could be application-based so that it is downloadable on application markets and devices 
would be easily available. 
8.3 Reliability and Validity 
As mentioned earlier, the data was collected from literature, survey and interviews. The 
literature used was mainly published peer-reviewed articles which are considered to be valid. 
The ones which were a thesis were gotten permission from the author to be used and giving 
them a chance to evaluate the parts utilized in this thesis. In some rare cases, secondary 
sources were used but those are always mentioned. The survey data on rounds 1—3 was 
studied by manual content analysis and by text mining tools. By using two ways the results 
are more reliable. Rounds 4—5 were based on numeric information but the number of 
repondentss was too small to use statistical methods. Therefore, only averages were 
calculated and they were used to establish a general idea of the answers. The data collected 
was triangulated to reach valid information. The organization structure was not tested in 
practice but all the participants of the survey and interviews were given a possibility to 
comment on it. They did not express differing opinions towards the argued principles. 
The used literature was up to date and versatile. The survey deserves some critique, 
however. Most respondents were from Finland and had a background from governmental or 
international organizations. All the stakeholder groups were not present. The respondents had 
a vast experience of the theme but more valid results would have been reached through a 
larger number of respondents from more versatile backgrounds. The interviews and 
information reviews were done by globally acknowledged professionals. Even though the 
thesis was done in cooperation with the IECEU project, their study data was used only to 
strengthen the idea that a lack of cooperation is a current and a major issue. Their 
assessment on the ways to improve the capabilities was not used. Therefore, this report can 
be seen as a separate study which possibly strengthens or weakens the IECEU project findings. 
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By conducting this study using qualitative content analysis, the results can be contested. It is 
possible that some other group would have analyzed the data differently or another 
respondent group might have answered differently. Thus, when using the collected data of 
this thesis it can be argued that the developed knowledge is valid due to the triangulation 
and fact finding. The knowledge developed can be used to train professionals more efficiently 
to widen their understanding on comprehensive system approach to peace operations.  
Since, in the case of state-building, the situation is complex, it cannot be argued that the 
suggestions of this thesis would work in all the circumstances. As Coning (2012, 290) argues, 
some states are neither capable of maintaining nor achieving sustainable peace by 
themselves. The outcome of this thesis was to give a generic idea on how an organization can 
be developed to support the objectives and, especially, to support the interaction of thd 
stakeholders. In the best case, this will contribute to the overall interaction and lessen the 
ineffective use of resources. 
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 Appendix 1 
Appendix 1: Introduction of Survey Respondents and Interviewees 
Identification 
number 
Gender Age Experience in time Description of Experience Round 
1 
Round 
2 
Round 
3 
Round 
4 
Round 
5 
1 Male 51—60 Related experience 6—10 years International Organization X X X   
2 Male 51—60 Related experience 6—10 years International Organization X X X   
3 Male 51—60 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization X X X X X 
4 Male 51—60 Related experience 6—10 years International Organization X X X X  
5 Male 51—60 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization X     
6 Female 41—50 Related experience 6—10 years International Organization X X    
7 Male 51—60 Related experience 2—5 years Governmental Organization X X X   
8 Male 31—40 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization X     
9 Male 51—60 Related experience 2—5 years Governmental Organization X  X   
10 Male 41—50 Related experience 2—5 years Governmental Organization X X X X X 
11 Male 61—70 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization X X  X X 
12 Female 41—50 Related experience 2—5 years International Organization X     
13 Male 31—40 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization X X    
14 Male 41—50 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization X X X X X 
15 Female 31—40 Related experience 2—5 years International Organization X X  X X 
16 Male 51—60 Related experience 2—5 years Governmental Organization X X    
17 Male 46—50 Related experience 11+ years Governmental Organization  X  X X 
18 Male 46—50 Related experience 2—5 years Governmental Organization  X   X 
19 Male 51—60 Related experience 2—5 years International Organization   X   
20 Female 21—30 Related experience 2—5 years Governmental Organization    X  
21 Male 41—50 Related experience 6—10 years Governmental Organization     X 
22 Female 51—60 Related experience 2—5 years International Organization     X 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Compiled back-ground of respondents: 
Combination   Number 
Gender Males 17 
  Females 5 
Age group 21—30 1 
  31—40 3 
  41—50 5 
  51—60 10 
  61—70 1 
Experience years Related experience 2—5 years. 10 
  Related experience 6—10 years. 11 
  Related experience 11+ years. 1 
Description of exp. International Organization 8 
  Governmental Organization 14 
  Non-Governmental Organization 0 
Participant in survey 1st Round 16 
  2nd Round 14 
  3rd Round 9 
  4th Round 8 
  5th Round 9 
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Appendix 2: Survey introduction and collected data 
 
Introduction 
Survey was conducted within the year 2016. It consisted of 5 rounds which all had two parts. 
The first part was about the basic information of the respondents and the second was about a 
selected theme. The questions are introduced below. The basic information and some other 
repeating parts are shown only once when first appeared. 
The raw data which is not presented in the sections is introduced after the questions. This 
appendix contains the data for rounds 4 and 5. 
 
Questions presented in the survey 
Comprehensive Crisis Management - First Round 
Thank you for participating. Estimated time to accomplish first round is 5—10 minutes. Note 
that the basic information will be collected only once during this study. 
 
Contact Information 
Only anonymous information will be shared. Your answer can not be connected to your name 
unless you especially give us a license to do so in question number 7. 
 
1. Fill in your contact information. 
This will be used to inform you about the phase of the study. 
First name *, Surname *, Phone, E-mail * 
 
2. Please point out more experts for our study. 
Experts are to have experience on the field of Comprehensive Crisis Management. Fill in a 
name and e-mail / row. 
Example: 
Name 1, e-mail 1 
Name 2, e-mail 2 
 
Basic information 
 
3. Fill in your gender. * 
Female, Male 
 
4. Fill in your age * 
21—30, 31—40, 41—50, 51—60, 61—70, 71—80, 81— 
 
5. Nationality * 
 
6. Which of the following internet services do you use? * 
We will invite you into a group, where you can see the anonymous answers given and 
comment on them. Note that other group members will see your participation. If you do not 
want to be invited into the group select the last option. 
Facebook, LinkedIn, WhatsApp, Other, I will participate only to an anonymous group, I do not 
want to be invited 
 
7. I allow my name being mentioned in the discussion forum established for the study and 
in the final report. * 
I allow my name being mentioned, I do not allow my name being mentioned. 
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8. I allow my name being connected to the answer that I have given in the discussion 
forum established for the study and in the final report. * 
I allow my name being connected to my answer., I do not allow my name being connected. 
 
9. Fill in your expertise. 
Fill in the tasks that have given you the most expertise in terms of Comprehensive Crisis 
Management. Maximum of four pieces. 
For Example: COUNTRY, TIME, TASK 
1. *, 2., 3., 4. 
 
10. Choose one of the following options that best describes your field of expertise. * 
Non-Governmental Organization (Fill in the name) 
Governmental Organization (Fill in the name) 
International Organization (Fill in the name) 
Other (Fill in the name) 
 
Defining Comprehensive Crisis Management 
11. What does Comprehensive Crisis Management mean to you? * 
 
12. What does Comprehensive Approach mean to you? * 
 
13. What should be the end-state of a Comprehensive Crisis Management operation be in 
your opinion? * 
 
Thank You for participating into the first round. We will soon inform you about the results 
and give you details to take part into the second round. 
 
Comprehensive Crisis Management - Second Round 
Thank you for participating. Estimated time to accomplish this round is 5-10 minutes. 
 
The 2nd round concentrates on the strategy of Crisis Managament Operations. We assume that 
a need for an operation has been identified. We have excluded the decicion making process 
involved in the establishment of an operation. With your support, we have defined some 
terms to accomplish this round. 
 
Need for an operation: 
Non-functioning society where individuals' basic needs are not being taken care of, there is 
no functioning administration and/or there is a need for international assistance. 
Strategy and End-state are to be found in the Figure below. 
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12. Here you can comment on the defined Strategy and End-state if you wish. 
 
13. What are the lines of operations (also called as lanes, elements, lines of operations or 
development etc.) of a Comprehensive Crisis Management Operation? 
The idea is to divide the operation into lines/lanes/elements that best describe the different 
aproaches to the situation.  
We are not looking for the organizations participating, but the lines of actions/operations 
that should exist to reach the end-state.  
Guidance: 
We have given you 15 lines. You can write the ones exceeding 15 into the "additional lines". If 
you have less than 15 lines, then just leave the rest empty. You can write a short explanation 
after the actual line. 
1st Line of Operation:, 2nd Line of Operation:, 3rd Line of Operation:, 4th Line of Operation:, 
5th Line of Operation:, 6th Line of Operation:, 7th Line of Operation:, 8th Line of Operation:, 
9th Line of Operation:, 10th Line of Operation:, 11h Line of Operation:, 12th Line of 
Operation:, 13th Line of Operation:, 14th Line of Operation:, 15th Line of Operation:, 
Additional lines:  
 
Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible. 
 
Comprehensive Crisis Management - Third Round 
Third round concentrates on the risks of a Crisis Managament Operation. We are looking for 
events related to the operation as a whole. The risks related to the lines of operations will be 
identified later. Remember that a risk can be a positive (opportunity) or a negative (threat) 
event. 
 
12. Here you can comment on the defined Strategy and End-state if you wish. 
If you have answered this during the second round, please continue to the next question. If 
you decide to answer this again we will add it to your previous answer. 
 
ADDED INFORMATION STARTS:  
Similar Figure as was presented above.  
ADDED INFORMATION ENDS 
 
13. What are the most crucial risks (threats or opportunities) related to the crisis 
management operation? 
Guidance: 
Stay on the high level. We are looking for the events affecting the operation. We have given 
you 15 lines. You can write the ones exceeding 15 into the "additional lines". If you have less 
than 15 lines, then just leave the rest empty. You can write a short explanation after the risk 
and also give an example of the operation you have noticed this to happen. 
1st Risk:, 2nd Risk:, 3rd Risk:, 4th Risk:, 5th Risk:, 6th Risk:, 7th Risk:, 8th Risk:, 9th Risk:, 
10th Risk:, 11th Risk:, 12th Risk:, 13th Risk:, 14th Risk:, 15th Risk:, Additional Risk: 
 
Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible. After 
this round there will be a longer period before moving into the fourth round. We will let 
you know as soon as possible. 
 
 
Comprehensive Crisis Management - Fourth Round 
 
Fourth round concentrates on the principles of organization structure. We have collected 
factors from organization theories and literature related to peace operations which support 
the structure formulating. You will be presented claims which you should evaluate. 
 
Terms used: 
Organization refers to the agency (UN, NATO, EU...) who is in the lead of implementing the 
operation. Stakeholders refers to all the agencies (NGOs, IOs, GOs) supporting the peace 
process. 
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12. A. Importance and B. occurrence of an individual factor or principle. * 
Question A importance. 
1 = Irrelevant 
2 = Minor importance 
3 = Medium importance 
4 = Very important 
5 = Extremely important 
 
Question B. Occurrence: 
1 = Never occurs 
2 = Rarely occurs 
3 = Sometimes occurs 
4 = Often occurs 
5 = Always occurs 
 
Options 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Pass 
 
1.A. Importance: Clear strategy connects all the actions. 
1.B. Occurrence: Clear strategy connects all the actions. 
2.A. Importance: Top leaders develop and state objectives top-down. 
2.B. Occurrence: Top leaders develop and state objectives top-down. 
3.A. Importance: High level objectives are jointly developed by all the stakeholders. 
3.B. Occurrence: High level objectives are jointly developed by all the stakeholders. 
4.A. Importance: High level objectives are understood by all the stakeholders. 
4.B. Occurrence: High level objectives are understood by all the stakeholders. 
5.A. Importance: Cooperation between the stakeholders is enhanced by common 
understanding of high level objectives. 
5.B. Occurrence: Cooperation between the stakeholders is enhanced by common 
understanding of high level objectives. 
6.A. Importance: Local ownership is ___ (Your answer). 
6.B. Occurrence: Local ownership ___(Your answer). 
7.A. Importance: The organization is built on the principles of the host nation. 
7.B. Occurrence: The organization is built on the principles of the host nation. 
8.A. Importance: Host nation capacity building is ___(Your answer). 
8.B. Occurrence: Host nation capacity building ___(Your answer). 
9.A. Importance: Host nation takes responsibility as soon as possible. 
9.B. Occurrence: Host nation takes responsibility as soon as possible. 
10.A. Importance: The stakeholders are intertwined with the environment. 
10.B. Occurrence: The stakeholders are intertwined with the environment. 
11.A. Importance: The organization evolves during the operation. 
11.B. Occurrence: The organization evolves during the operation. 
12.A. Importance: The stakeholders perform as one. 
12.B. Occurrence: The stakeholders perform as one. 
13.A. Importance: Resources of the stakeholders are used to achieve overall objectives. 
13.B. Occurrence: Resources of the stakeholders are used to achieve overall objectives. 
14.A. Importance: Cooperation exceeds intra-organization (office/branch) boundaries. 
14.B. Occurrence: Cooperation exceeds intra-organization (office/branch) boundaries. 
15.A. Importance: Cooperation exceeds agency (NGO, GO, IO) boundaries. 
15.B. Occurrence: Cooperation exceeds agency (NGO, GO, IO) boundaries. 
16.A. Importance: Communities are ___ (Your answer) to success. 
16.B. Occurrence: Communities are ___ (Your answer) to success. 
17.A. Importance: Strategic alliances are ___ (Your answer) to success. 
17.B. Occurrence: Strategic alliances are ___ (Your answer) to success. 
18.A. Importance: Networks are ___ (Your answer) to success. 
18.B. Occurrence: Networks are ___ (Your answer) to success. 
19.A. Importance: Organization structure is approved by the stakeholders. 
19.B. Occurrence: Organization structure is approved by the stakeholders. 
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20.A. Importance: Overall information flow is open to the stakeholders. 
20.B. Occurrence: Overall information flow is open to the stakeholders. 
21.A. Importance: Follow-up is a/an ___ (Your answer) part of all actions conducted. 
21.B. Occurrence: Follow-up ___ (Your answer) as a part of all actions conducted. 
22.A. Importance: Tasks are planned, conducted and followed jointly with the stakeholders. 
22.B. Occurrence: Tasks are planned, conducted and followed jointly with the stakeholders. 
23.A. Importance: Each superior has a specific task. 
23.B. Occurrence: Each superior has a specific task. 
24.A. Importance: Every person has only one superior who gives tasks and who he/she reports 
to. 
24.B. Occurrence: Every person has only one superior who gives tasks and who he/she reports 
to. 
 
13. You can give your comments on the factors. Please refer to a number if possible. 
Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible. 
 
Comprehensive Crisis Management - Fifth Round 
 
Thank you for participating. Estimated time to accomplish this round is 10-20 minutes. 
 
Fifth round concentrates on stakeholder's power and interest to affect the aspects of crisis 
management. The assumption is that the stakeholder has decided to participate. We 
understand that the environment is always different.  
You are to evaluate the power and interest based on your experience. It should present your 
view of the stakeholder performing at its realistic best. e.g. United Nations cannot use all the 
resources in one mission but the idea is to give a direction of what it could realisticly be. 
Please take look at the Figure below to understand the idea and outcome. The ones 
benefitting of unstable situation are often referred as spoilers. 
 
12. What is the power and interest related to Security and Rule of Law of a certain 
stakeholder 
(Security and Rule of Law: providing security for groups and individuals. Functional justice 
and law enforcement systems.) 
 
Some guidance: 
 List refers to the list on the left. Fourfold is the picture on the right. 
 The stakeholders will be automatically added into the fourhold starting from "1. 
United Nations" and ending to "20. Spoilers - International/Foreign" when you click a 
position in the fourhold. The next stakehoder to be positioned will be marked grey in 
list. 
 If you misplaced a stakeholder it can be repositioned by clicking the stakeholder and 
clicking the fourhold again. 
 If you wish to pass a stakeholder just click the next suitable stakeholder in the list. 
 If you wish to find the stakeholders from the map and the number is not clear you can 
allways click the stakeholder list and it will be shown red in the fourhold. 
 
ADDED INFORMATION STARTS:  
Each 20 stakeholders were estimated to be related to all the operational lines. Stakeholders 
and the fourhold will be shown only related to the first question.  
ADDED INFORMATION ENDS 
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13. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
 
ADDED INFORMATION STARTS:  
Each 20 stakehodlers were estimated related to all the operational lines. The operational 
lines and the question related will be shown below. Neither the fourhold nor the stakeholder 
list is presented again.  
ADDED INFORMATION ENDS 
 
14. What is the power and interest related to Governance and Political System of a 
certain stakeholder. 
(Governance and Political system: managing issues of common concern and delivering basic 
services. Possibility to elections.) 
 
15. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
 
16. What is the power and interest related to Human Rights of a certain stakeholder. 
(Human Rights: educating, respecting and monitoring of Human Rights.) 
 
17. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
 
18. What is the power and interest related to Humanitarian aid of a certain stakeholder. 
(Humanitarian Aid: emergency services and recovery services related to health, nutrition, 
shelter and supporting refugees and internally displaced persons.) 
 
19. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
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20. What is the power and interest related to Development and Economics of a certain 
stakeholder. 
(Development and Economics: construction of infrastructure and facilitating economic 
growth.)  
 
21. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
 
22. What is the power and interest related to Media and Civil Society of a certain 
stakeholder. 
(Media and Civil Society: supporting the information flow and formation of interest groups.)  
 
23. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
 
24. What is the power and interest related to Management of a certain stakeholder. 
(Management: overall management and leading of the actions.) 
 
25. Comments related to previous theme. For instance, you can name organizations you 
assess to be necessary for this theme. 
 
Thank you for answering. We will inform you about the results as soon as possible. 
 
THIS ENDS THE QUESTIONS 
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Appendix 3: Introduction to the risk identification and root reason assessment 
 
The risk assessment process used is introduced in this appendix. The aim was to find potential 
failure factors for the strategic objective. After recognizing the factors, they were mitigated 
in the organization structure where possible. The list below describes the process step by 
step. 
1. Risk Identification by professionals (Survey round 3, Appendix 2) 
2. Risk categorization by author is presented in Figure 34. 
Figure 34: Risk categorization 
3. Root cause analysis by the author 
a. The author has the overall analysis as a separate file but an example is 
provided below in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35: Example of root cause analysis on Cooperation and Coordination category 
4. Analyzing the root causes and the risks related. 
a. A total of 46 risks were identified and 30 of them were related to stakeholders 
having own interests. The rest of the relations is introduced in Figure 36. 
b. For example, their own interest can be mitigated in some extent. This is done 
by joint planning, acting and information flow. This is assessed to enable a 
better understanding of the strategic objectives and the overall situation. 
This possibly contributes to the level of cooperation. 
 
Figure 36: Amount of risks related to root causes 
5. Implementing mitigations into organization structure where possible. 
